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I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2010, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc dismissed a potential
challenge against the U.S. government’s extraordinary rendition program.
The suit was filed against Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., a subsidiary of Boeing
Company, for its alleged role in facilitating the transportation of detainees to
countries where they were subjected to presumably illegal interrogation
techniques amounting to torture.1 Although the lawsuit was filed against a
private actor, the government was allowed to intervene and ask for
dismissal.2 A closely divided court dismissed the case under the state secret
privilege as formulated in United States v. Reynolds,3 finding that
“Jeppesen’s alleged role and its attendant liability cannot be isolated from
aspects that are secret and protected. Because the facts underlying plaintiffs’
claims are so infused with these secrets, any plausible effort by Jeppesen to
defend against them would create an unjustifiable risk of revealing state
secrets . . . .”4
The decision, one of several recent federal court rulings in lawsuits
attempting to challenge national security policy and involving state secrets,5
1
Mohammed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010). In December
2010, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court, and was denied in May 2011,
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 179 181 S. Ct. 2442 (2011).
2
Id. at 1094 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). While governmental intervention in itself is not
novel, see, e.g., DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 2001), in
the context of national security litigation that attempts to challenge what is arguably
unconstitutional or otherwise illegal government behavior, the pervasiveness of the state
secrets privilege in lawsuits between private actors potentially absolves from responsibility an
entire group of potential defendants who may have been complicit in dubious government
behavior. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77,
98 (2010) (analyzing the relationship between government contractors and claims of the state
secrets privilege in recent years and observing, inter alia, that “many government
contractors . . . benefit from use of the state secrets privilege in suits that allege a range of
illegal activity”). Even more troubling, Donohue notes that this gives rise to the potential for
“graymail,” or the risk that private companies with access to information that is sensitive or
potentially politically damaging for the government may threaten to reveal such information if
the government does not intervene and raise the state secrets claim on the company’s behalf.
Id. In any case, Donohue concludes, regardless of whether the government actually gets
involved in such private litigation, the threat of invoking the state secrets privilege gives
companies a tactical advantage. Id. at 99.
3
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
4
Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1088.
5
See, e.g., El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539 (E.D. Va. 2006) (dismissing the
plaintiff’s challenge to the extraordinary rendition program based on the government’s claim
of state secrets), aff’d, El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); Al-Haramain
Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1229 (D. Or. 2006) (accepting the
government’s claim that a document required by the plaintiff to substantiate standing to
challenge the warrantless wiretap program was protected by the state secrets privilege, yet
permitting Al-Haramain’s witnesses to file in camera affidavits attesting to the contents of the
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is reflective of the flaws of contemporary application of the state secrets
privilege. To begin with, the state secrets privilege as formulated by the
Supreme Court in Reynolds created an inherent imbalance in favor of the
government by providing privileged information with absolute protection
once the privilege has been asserted successfully.6 Moreover, the majority’s
application of the privilege in Jeppesen has compounded this flaw tenfold by
applying the state secrets privilege as a nonjusticiability doctrine rather than
as an evidentiary privilege.7 In so doing, it has created an overly broad,
substantive barrier for national security litigation—one that goes well beyond
the original underlying rationale of the privilege. As a result, plaintiffs
attempting to challenge potentially unconstitutional government behavior are
forced to internalize the costs associated with asserting the privilege. From a
policy perspective, this is undesirable.
Part II of this Article provides a brief background of the state secrets
privilege. Part III presents in detail the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in
Jeppesen. Part IV goes on to analyze the majority’s gross misapplication of
the state secrets privilege in Jeppesen. It also criticizes the absence of a
balancing test under Reynolds, which would allow courts to weigh competing
interests of the parties when an assertion of privilege is made by the
government. A comparative perspective of the treatment of privileged

document which had been inadvertently disclosed in the past), rev’d and remanded AlHaramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district
court’s judgment that the lawsuit was not barred by the state secrets privilege, reversing the
district court’s judgment allowing plaintiffs to file in camera affidavits attesting to the
contents of the sealed document, and remanding the case for further proceedings); In re NSA
Telecomms. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) preempted the state secrets privilege in
connection with electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes and would appear to displace
the state secrets privilege for purposes of plaintiffs’ claims); In re NSA Telecomms. Records
Litig., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (ruling that the court would review the sealed
document ex parte and in camera); In re NSA Telecomms. Records Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d
1182 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (granting summary judgment to plaintiffs); Hepting v. AT&T Corp.,
439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 1010–11 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (denying the government’s motion to dismiss
based on state secrets grounds and ordering the parties to show cause in writing why the court
should not appoint an expert “to assist the court in determining whether disclosing particular
evidence would create a ‘reasonable danger’ of harming national security”), remanded,
Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 539 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d
250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (dismissing Arar’s challenge to the extraordinary rendition program on
grounds other than the state secrets privilege, which was not analyzed although raised by the
government), aff’d en banc, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated and superseded on
rehearing en banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing an attempt to challenge the inclusion of Al-Aulaqi’s son on the
government’s “kill list” on grounds other than state secrets privilege, which was not analyzed
although raised by the government).
6
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
7
Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1089.
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information in national security litigation in Israel then follows in Part V.
The Israeli experience not only provides a different approach to legislative
and judicial mechanisms than the one currently in use in the U.S but also
illuminates an intrinsically different attitude regarding the feasibility of
adjudicating national security matters. In the present environment in the
United States, it may be difficult to conceive of adjudication of such
sensitive matters.
However, Israeli jurisprudence shows that such
adjudication is possible given not only an accommodating legal scheme but
also a more accommodating mindset, both of which may be attainable in the
United States as well.
II. THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary executive
privilege that permits the government to bar the disclosure of information if
“there is a reasonable danger” that disclosure will “expose military matters
which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.”8 As
framed by the Ninth Circuit majority opinion in Jeppesen,9 the state secrets
privilege has two variations originating from two Supreme Court precedents:
Totten v. United States10 and Reynolds.
The Totten version of the state secrets privilege is the more drastic of the
two. It completely bars adjudication of certain matters if such adjudication
“would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself
regards as confidential.”11 In other words, Totten stands for the proposition
that “where the very subject matter of the action . . . [is] a matter of state
secret,” an action may be “dismissed on the pleadings without ever reaching
the question of evidence.”12 It has been found to apply primarily to suits
which allege the existence of a covert agreement or relationship between the
plaintiff and the government.13
8

Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1077.
10
Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
11
Id. at 107.
12
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26. Totten specifically involved an alleged agreement to
compensate a spy for his wartime espionage services during the Civil War. The Court held
that the action was barred because it was premised on the existence of a “contract for secret
services with the government,” which was “a fact not to be disclosed.” Totten, 92 U.S. at 107;
see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005) (affirming that the Totten bar precluded judicial
review of any claim based on a covert agreement to engage in espionage for the United
States).
13
See Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1078–79 (citing Weinberger v. Catholic Action of
Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 146–47 (1981) in rejecting the contention that the
Totten bar cannot apply unless the plaintiff is a party to a secret agreement with the
government). The dissent also notes in Jeppesen that “[c]ourts have applied the Totten bar in
9
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Application of the state secrets privilege under Reynolds14 is narrower.15
It allows the court to exclude privileged evidence from a case. This requires,
whenever possible, disentangling sensitive from nonsensitive information to
allow for the release of only the latter. However, there are occasions when,
as a practical matter, such a dichotomy is impractical. In such cases, the
court may not be able to restrict access strictly to sensitive information and
may be forced to deny the parties access to nonsensitive information as well,
so as to avoid the risk of unintentionally disclosing a state secret. Hence, in
the relatively easy cases, litigation will proceed by simply walling off the
privileged information. The more difficult cases will require prohibiting
access to a larger chunk of evidence, which may include nonprivileged
evidence fused together with privileged evidence. Granted, this may burden
the parties, however, it does not foreclose adjudication altogether.
The most difficult cases are those in which walling off the evidence is
insufficient. In such cases, according to the majority in Jeppesen, the
Reynolds privilege, in effect, converges with the Totten privilege and, like
the latter, requires dismissal of the case altogether.16 As the Ninth Circuit
one of two scenarios: (1) The plaintiff is party to a secret agreement with the government; or
(2) The plaintiff sues to solicit information from the government on a ‘state secret’ matter.”
Id. at 1096 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). Contra D.A. Jeremy Telman, Intolerable Abuses:
Rendition for Torture and the State Secrets Privilege, 63 ALA. L. REV. 429 (2011) (arguing
that in fact “the Totten doctrine only applies to bar claims by parties to secret agreements with
the government if the purpose of the suit is to enforce the terms of secret agreement”
(emphasis added)). Telman further argues that “the logic of Totten cannot and should not
extend to parties whose interaction with the government was involuntary,” calling the Ninth
Circuit’s reliance on Weinberger in this regard “misplaced.” Id. at 457.
14
Reynolds involved a suit for damages against the government brought by the widows of
three civilian observers killed in a military plane crash. In discovery, plaintiffs sought
production of the Air Force’s official accident investigation report and the statements of the
surviving crew members. The Air Force refused to produce the materials, citing the need to
protect national security and military secrets. The Secretary of the Air Force wrote a letter to
the district court to this effect. The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force filed an affidavit
making a formal claim of privilege, stating that the material sought by the plaintiffs could not
be provided “without seriously hampering national security.” Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 5. The
district court ordered the government to produce the documents in camera so the court could
determine whether they contained privileged material. When the government refused, the
court sanctioned the government by establishing the facts on the issue of negligence in
plaintiffs’ favor. The Supreme Court reversed and sustained the government’s claim of
privilege and provided guidance on how claims of privilege should be analyzed.
15
See Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through
Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 117 (2007) (“The state secrets privilege
was not crafted in Reynolds to be a complete bar on the adjudication of complaints by the
courts . . . .”).
16
Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1083. In support of its position that Reynolds, like Totten, allowed
dismissal of a lawsuit, the majority did not cite Reynolds itself. Rather, it cited several federal
court rulings, none of which were Supreme Court decisions. It seems that lower courts
interpret Reynolds as accommodating a blanket dismissal of suits involving privileged
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explained in its majority opinion in Jeppesen, there are three circumstances
which justify terminating a case under the Reynolds privilege: first, a
plaintiff’s claim is dismissible if the plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case
without the nonprivileged evidence.17 Second, a defendant is entitled to
summary judgment should the privilege deny a defendant a valid defense to
the plaintiff’s claim.18 Third, and most expansive, even if the privileged
evidence is unnecessary to a claim or defense, should the risk of revealing
state secrets during the litigation prove unacceptable, a court may refuse to
proceed with the claim.19
The bare assertion of the privilege by the executive is not sufficient to
invoke it. First, the privilege must be asserted by the head of the department
which has the responsibility for the information and evidence in question.20
Next, it is up to the court to determine whether the circumstances warrant
assertion of the claim,21 taking into account the plaintiff’s need for
information to litigate the case; the greater the need of the plaintiff to receive
the information, the deeper the court must delve into the state secret
assertion.22 However, the privilege is absolute in the sense that once it has
been validly asserted, it applies regardless of what the opposing interests at
stake may be.23 Some commentators have opined that in practice, courts
information. Id.; see also Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National
Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1307 (2007) (“[T]he government has a long
history of requesting dismissal (or summary judgment) on state secret grounds.”). In an
appendix to his article, Chesney reviews all of the post-Reynolds decisions which included an
assertion of the state secrets privilege. Of these eighty-nine decisions, only one, Tenet v. Doe,
is a Supreme Court decision. According to the data analyzed by Chesney, over 30% of
requests for dismissal or summary judgment (thirty-three) were granted. Id. app. at 1315.
However, as noted earlier, the Court in Tenet dismissed the complaint based not on Reynolds,
but on Totten, which it described as a “categorical bar” distinct from the “state secrets
evidentiary privilege.” Tenet, 544 U.S. at 9–10. Hence, it is unclear which of these 33
decisions were based exclusively on the state secrets privilege as envisaged by the Supreme
Court in Reynolds. See also infra notes 26–30 and accompanying text (discussing the view
that Totten and Reynolds are possibly two distinct legal doctrines).
17
Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1083.
18
Id.
19
Id.; see also Holly Wells, Note, The State Secrets Privilege: Overuse Causing
Unintended Consequences, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 967, 975 (2008) (“[B]ecause the secrets are
essential to the subject matter of the litigation, any attempts to move forward threaten
disclosure of these secrets.”).
20
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953). Lyons cites “two rare instances” in
which “courts rejected the privilege on grounds that it was not properly asserted with regards
to procedures”: Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) and Yang v. Reno, 157 F.R.D.
625 (M.D. Pa. 1994). Lyons, supra note 15, at 111. However, as Lyons notes, in both cases,
the courts allowed the government to reassert the privilege. Id.
21
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8.
22
Id. at 11.
23
Id.; Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1931, 1943 (2007) (citing El-Masri v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va.
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show substantial deference to executive assertions of privilege,24 primarily
because of a presumption that the executive has greater expertise than the
judiciary with regard to military and diplomatic matters.25
It should be noted that some view Reynolds only as the basis for the state
secrets privilege, whereas Totten is viewed as standing for the principle that
the courts may dismiss claims which rely on a covert agreement with the
government.26 The relatively recent Supreme Court decision in Tenet v. Doe
has been interpreted by some as having affirmed this distinction.27 However,
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Jeppesen of the state secrets privilege views
both precedents as separate prongs of essentially the same doctrine.28 This
framing is unsurprising given that, as is discussed below, the Jeppesen
majority goes on to dismiss the suit presumably entirely under the Reynolds
state secrets privilege.29 Creating a linkage between Totten and Reynolds

2006), aff’d El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007)); Lucien J. Dhooge, The
State Secrets Privilege and Corporate Complicity in Extraordinary Rendition, 37 GA. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 469, 496 (2009) (“[E]ven the most compelling need demonstrated by the
plaintiffs . . . cannot overcome the national security and foreign relations interests protected by
the privilege. The strength of the plaintiffs’ claims and the disturbing nature of the behavior
alleged in the complaint are equally irrelevant . . . .”).
24
William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL.
SCI. Q. 85, 98 (2005); LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED
PRESIDENTIAL POWERS AND THE REYNOLDS CASE 257 (2006) (“What Reynolds did was to send
an ominous signal that in matters of national security, the judiciary is willing to fold its tent
and join the executive branch.”); Lyons, supra note 15, at 108 (describing the “ ‘utmost
deference’ ” by the courts to executive assertions of the privilege).
25
El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 536; Chesney, supra note 16, at 1288; Lyons, supra note 15,
at 130.
26
See, e.g., Christina E. Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability, 26 CONST.
COMMENTARY 625, 639 (2010) (arguing, inter alia, that “Reynolds and Totten . . . involve
distinct situations that argue against eliding the boundaries of the two doctrines. . . . From a
due process perspective, a plaintiff facing dismissal is not in the same position as a party to a
secret espionage contract who understood the nature of her relationship with the
government.”); Sudha Setty, Litigating Secrets: Comparative Perspectives on the State
Secrets Privilege, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 201, 233 (2009) (“[T]he relevance of Totten to the state
secrets privilege is open to debate.”); Lyons, supra note 15, at 120–21 (“[A]n assertion of the
Totten privilege is distinct and distinguishable from the state secrets privilege.”).
27
Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 10 (2005) (“There is, in short, no basis for respondents’ and the
Court of Appeals’ view that the Totten bar has been reduced to an example of the state secrets
privilege.”).
28
Mohammed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010); see also AlHaramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Although
Reynolds is widely viewed as the first explicit recognition of the privilege by the Supreme
Court . . . the Supreme Court considered a form of the privilege—the non-justiciability of
certain state secrets cases—in Totten v. United States . . . .”); Telman, supra note 13, at 441,
445 (stating plainly that the Ninth Circuit “erred in a fundamental way in treating Totten as a
sub-category of the [state secrets privilege]” and that the “conflation of the [state secrets
privilege] and Totten is an error”).
29
Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1073.
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lends more support for a more extreme application of the state secrets
privilege than envisaged under Reynolds.30
Some argue that the state secrets privilege ought to be viewed as
constitutional in nature, derived from Article II of the Constitution.31
Viewed this way, the privilege also rests on theories of executive power32
and separation of powers33 rather than just on common law.34 This approach
would affect the power of Congress or the courts to limit the scope of the
privilege.35 However, even if taken as a privilege of constitutional origin, it
does not follow that the privilege is exempt from review.36 Constitutional
executive action is not immune to legislative or judicial oversight, as an
integral part of checks and balances between the three branches,37 as will be
further illustrated below.
III. MOHAMED V. JEPPESEN DATAPLAN, INC.
Since 9/11, the state secrets privilege has been consistently raised by the
government with regard to litigation attempting to challenge two executive
policies: the extraordinary rendition program, which was the subject of the
Jeppesen lawsuit, and the National Security Agency’s (NSA) warrantless
wiretapping program.38 More recently, it has also been asserted in the
30
See Lyons, supra note 15, at 122 (“This distinction [between Totten and Reynolds] is
especially relevant since recent invocations of the state secrets privilege appear to be
extending the parameters of the privilege such that the privilege is indistinguishable from
Totten, despite their obvious differences.”).
31
As a matter of fact, the U.S. government in its briefs has argued that the privilege is
constitutional in origin. See D.A. Jeremy Telman, Our Very Privileged Executive: Why the
Judiciary Can (and Should) Fix the State Secrets Privilege, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 499, 506 (2007)
(“In its recent memoranda in support of various motions invoking the [state secrets] Privilege,
the U.S. government has again argued that the Privilege is constitutional in origin.”).
32
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710–11 (1974) (discussing the deference
courts have traditionally shown toward Article II duties of the President and referring in this
context to United States v. Reynolds).
33
Telman, supra note 31, at 505–06.
34
Id. at 506.
35
See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 303 (4th Cir. 2007) (discussing the
“constitutional dimension” of the privilege); cf. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 11 (2005) (Stevens
& Ginsburg, JJ., concurring) (describing Totten as a “federal common-law rule” and stating
that Congress thus “can modify” that rule if it wishes to do so).
36
See Telman, supra note 31, at 506–07 (discussing “judicial and legislative oversight” of
the state secret privilege).
37
Id. at 507 (“Courts and Congress must not go too far in restricting the executive branch
from pursuing the foreign affairs strategies it believes necessary for national security, but
those branches also must maintain sufficient power to check the executive and protect
individual rights.”).
38
Much of the writing regarding recent use of the state secrets privilege has addressed, in
addition to legal challenges to the extraordinary rendition program, litigation regarding the Bush
administration’s warrantless wiretap program. In December 2005, a New York Times article
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context of an attempted challenge to drone-operated targeting of individuals
outside the United States.39
Plaintiffs in Jeppesen were all apprehended and taken into custody
following 9/11 in various countries around the world.40 They claimed that at
some point during their detention, they were transferred to U.S. custody or
were held in Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) “dark prisons” outside U.S.
territory, where they were detained incommunicado and underwent harsh
interrogation.41 Plaintiffs presented disturbing accounts of what they had
been subjected to in the course of their detention, including beatings, sensory
deprivation, humiliation, threats of death, and other techniques amounting to
both physical and psychological torture.42 Based on publically available
information, plaintiffs concluded that they had been subjected to the U.S.

revealed that President Bush authorized the NSA to intercept communications that had
originated or terminated in the United States, bypassing the statutory mechanism set forth in
FISA (FISA was subsequently amended in 2008 to permit many of the practices undertaken by
the Bush administration). James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. Numerous lawsuits materialized following disclosure
of the program’s existence, both against the government and against the telecommunications
providers who had facilitated the government program. See cases cited supra note 5. Most
litigation has been unable to proceed due to the successful assertion of the state secrets privilege,
which has prevented plaintiffs from having access to documents necessary to substantiate their
standing to sue. See cases cited supra note 5. While such litigation is not the focus of this
Article, the government’s assertion of privilege in the surveillance litigation raises essentially the
same concerns as does its assertion in the context of the extraordinary rendition litigation. See
Frost, supra note 23, at 1942–50 (discussing the history of El-Masri, Arar, Hepting, ACLU v.
NSA, and the pretrial consolidation to NSA wiretapping challenges); Michael C. Miller, Note,
Standing in the Wake of the Terrorist Surveillance Program: A Modified Standard for
Challenges to Secret Government Surveillance, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 1039, 1057–67 (2008)
(discussing similar cases and focusing on standing issues regarding these cases). For an analysis
of the legality of the warrantless wiretap program, see generally Evan Tsen Lee, The Legality of
the NSA Wiretapping Program, 12 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 1 (2006) (concluding that the NSA
wiretapping program violates FISA, and therefore criminal liability attaches to the violators);
Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. & Robert B. Shaw, Down to the Wire: Assessing the Constitutionality of
the National Security Agency’s Warrantless Wiretapping Program: Exit the Rule of Law, 17 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 429 (2006) (arguing that the President lacks Congressional or inherent
authority to effectuate the wiretapping program); ELIZABETH B. BAZAN & JENNIFER K. ELSEA,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEMORANDUM, PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT WARRANTLESS
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE TO GATHER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 44 (2006),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf (finding that the President’s legal
justifications for the NSA wiretapping program “does not seem . . . well-grounded”). Cf. U.S.
DEP’T JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/whitepa
peronnsalegalauthorities.pdf (setting forth the government’s position as to the legal basis for the
NSA’s warrantless wiretap program as authorized by the President).
39
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
40
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010).
41
Id. at 1074.
42
Id. at 1074–75.
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government’s extraordinary rendition program, the existence of which was
publically acknowledged on several occasions by high-level government
officials, including the President and Secretary of State.43
Rather than suing the government directly, plaintiffs brought suit against
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.44 Plaintiffs alleged that Jeppesen had provided
“flight planning and logistical support services to the aircraft and crew on all
of the flights transporting each of the five plaintiffs among the various
locations where they were detained and allegedly subjected to torture.”45
The complaint also alleged that “Jeppesen provided this assistance with
actual or constructive ‘knowledge of the objectives of the rendition
program,’ including knowledge that the plaintiffs ‘would be subjected
to . . . torture.’ ” 46 Hence, the plaintiffs argued that Jeppesen was liable
under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, for their forced
disappearance, as well as torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment.47
Before Jeppesen responded to the complaint, the U.S. government moved
to intervene and requested dismissal of the complaint under the state secrets
privilege.48 The district court granted the government’s motions and entered
a judgment in favor of Jeppesen, finding that at the core of the case were
allegations of covert U.S. military or CIA operations in foreign countries
against foreign nationals—a subject matter which was a state secret.49 The
plaintiffs appealed and a three-judge panel reversed and remanded, holding
that the government had failed to establish a basis for dismissal under the
state secrets privilege, but permitting the government to reassert the privilege
at subsequent stages of the litigation.50 However, the Ninth Circuit agreed to
rehear the case en banc in order to “resolve questions of exceptional

43
For a summary of disclosures regarding the extraordinary rendition program, see Reply
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants on Rehearing En Banc at 19–22, Mohamed v. Jeppesen
Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-15693) (summarizing the known history
of the program’s disclosures); see also Dhooge, supra note 23, at 474–75 (noting that the
program was disclosed by President Bush on September 6, 2006 and ended in January 2009).
44
Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1075.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Motion to Dismiss at 34, Jeppesen, 563 F.3d 992 (No. C-07-02798-JW). Two
declarations, one redacted and one classified, were filed by then-Director of the CIA, General
Michael Hayden, asserting that “[d]isclosure of the information . . . reasonably could be
expected to cause serious—and in some instances exceptionally grave—damage to the
national security of the United States.” Id.
49
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2008),
rev’d, Jeppesen, 563 F.3d 992.
50
Jeppesen, 563 F.3d 992.
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importance regarding the scope and application of the state secrets
doctrine.”51
As previously mentioned, the court analyzed both Totten and Reynolds as
two prongs of the same doctrine—the state secrets privilege.52 It found that
some of the plaintiffs’ claims may well fall within the Totten bar.53 Other
allegations, however, such as the claim that Jeppesen should be liable simply
for what it “should have known” about the extraordinary rendition program,
were not so obviously tied to proof of a secret agreement between Jeppesen
and the government.54 In any event, the court found no need to resolve the
question of precisely which claims may be barred under Totten because it
found that even application of the ordinarily narrower Reynolds privilege
required dismissal of the case.55
The court agreed with the government that at least some of the matters
related to litigation of the case were valid state secrets which should not be
revealed in the name of national security56 (although it held that the existence
of the program itself was not a state secret).57 The court then moved on to
examine the effect of the privilege on the proceedings, i.e., whether the case
could nonetheless proceed or it required dismissal at the pleading stage. For
this purpose, it assumed that plaintiffs’ prima facie case and Jeppesen’s
defense did not inevitably depend on privileged evidence.58
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit held that dismissal was required under
Reynolds because there was “no feasible way to litigate Jeppesen’s alleged
liability without creating an unjustifiable risk of divulging state secrets.”59
As the majority explained, “[w]hether or not Jeppesen provided logistical
support in connection with the [program], there [was] precious little Jeppesen
51

Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1077.
Elsewhere, Totten has been interpreted as a separate yet related doctrine. For a
discussion of the view that Totten and Reynolds stand for different doctrines, see supra notes
26–30 and accompanying text.
53
Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1084 (“In particular, [plaintiffs’] allegations that Jeppesen
conspired with agents of the United States in plaintiffs’ forced disappearance, torture and
degrading treatment are premised on the existence of an alleged covert relationship between
Jeppesen and the government. . . .”).
54
Id. at 1085.
55
Id. The dissent rejected the majority’s position that Totten potentially applied to some of
the claims raised by the plaintiffs, stating that “Totten’s logic simply cannot be stretched to
encompass the claims here, as they are brought by third-party plaintiffs against nongovernment defendant actors for their involvement in tortious activities.” Id. at 1097
(Hawkins, J., dissenting).
56
Id. at 1086 (majority opinion). In fact, all of the judges on the panel agreed that the claim
of privilege was proper, but had diverging views on its scope and impact on the plaintiffs’
case. Id.
57
Id. at 1090.
58
Id. at 1087.
59
Id. at 1099 (emphasis added).
52
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could say about its relevant conduct and knowledge without revealing
information about how the United States government does or does not
conduct covert operations.”60 It went on to determine that this would remain
the case no matter what protective procedures, such as protective orders or
restrictions on testimony, the district court would employ because of the
nature of the adversarial litigation process, in the course of which privileged
information could inadvertently be revealed.61 The court dismissed the
dissent’s objection to employing the Reynolds bar to dismiss a case at its
outset.62
Finally, recognizing the harsh results of its ruling, the court noted that its
decision did not foreclose possible nonjudicial relief for the plaintiffs. Such
potential avenues of relief included an independent assessment by the
government of the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims (e.g., “reparations to
Japanese Latin Americans abducted from Latin America for internment in
the United States during World War II”);63 an investigation by Congress into
the allegations;64 the enactment of a private bill which would grant plaintiffs
compensation;65 or the enactment by Congress of “remedial legislation
authorizing appropriate causes of action and procedures to address claims”
similar to those raised in Jeppesen.66 The majority concluded its opinion by
noting
that Totten has it limits, that every effort should be made to
parse claims to salvage a case like this using the Reynolds
approach, that the standards for peremptory dismissal are very
high and it is the district court’s role to use its fact-finding and
other tools to full advantage before it concludes that the rare
step of dismissal is justified.67
The dissenting opinion parted ways with the majority primarily with
regard to the stage at which the state secrets privilege was to be applied. The
dissent put great weight on the fact that although the state secrets privilege
60

Id. at 1089 (emphasis in original).
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 1091.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 1091–92.
66
Id. at 1092.
67
Id. at 1092–93. The majority was joined by Judge Bea in a concurring opinion who was
of the view that the case should be dismissed under Totten. “[E]very claim in the Plaintiffs’
complaint is based on the allegation that officials of the United States government arrested
and detained Plaintiffs and subjected them to specific interrogation techniques. Those alleged
facts, not merely Jeppesen’s role in such activities, are a matter of state secret.” Id. at 1093
(Bea, J., concurring).
61
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was presumably a rule of evidence—an assumption embraced by the
majority—the majority opinion nonetheless allowed the privilege to apply at
the pleading stage.68 Questioning the prudence of this, the dissent objected
to “permit[ting] the removal of entire allegations resulting in out-and-out
dismissal of the entire suit.”69 It posited instead that the privilege was
intended to operate at the pleading stage to except from the implications of
Rule 8(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) the refusal to
answer certain allegations,70 and not to permit the defendants to avoid filing
a responsive pleading at all.71 To do otherwise, as the majority had done,
would in effect turn the state secrets privilege—an evidentiary privilege—
into an immunity doctrine.72
The dissent also put an emphasis on the procedural aspect of the
proceedings, namely that the government had requested a FRCP Rule 12
dismissal of the complaint on the basis of a failure to state a relevant claim.
In this regard, it found itself unable to determine “whether the Reynolds
evidentiary privilege applie[d] without (1) an actual request for discovery of
specific evidence, (2) an explanation from Plaintiffs of their need for the
evidence, and (3) a formal invocation of the privilege . . . with respect to that
evidence, explaining why it must remain confidential.”73 It concluded that
neither the FRCP nor Reynolds allowed it “to dismiss [the] case for ‘failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,’ on the basis of an
evidentiary privilege relevant, not to the sufficiency of the complaint, but
only to the sufficiency of evidence available to later substantiate the
complaint.”74
In addition, the dissent criticized the majority’s dismissal of the “suit out
of fear of ‘compelled or inadvertent disclosure’ of secret information during
the course of litigation.”75 It noted that it had “confidence in the ability of
district court judges” to adjudicate sensitive matters without inadvertently
divulging privileged information.76 It berated the majority for assuming
“that the government might make mistakes in what it produces, or that

68

Id. at 1097–98 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1098.
70
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(6). This rule determines that an allegation is admitted if a responsive
pleading is required and the allegation is not denied.
71
Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1098 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (“[A] proper invocation of the
privilege does not excuse a defendant from the requirement to file a responsive pleading; the
obligation is to answer those allegations that can be answered and to make a specific claim of
the privilege as to the rest, so the suit can move forward.”).
72
Id.
73
Id. at 1100.
74
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)).
75
Id. at 1095 n.4.
76
Id.
69
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district courts might compel the disclosure of documents legitimately
covered by the state secrets privilege.”77
The dissent’s reasoning did not remain strictly theoretical. The minority
mapped the voluminous public record materials submitted by the plaintiffs
and appended to its opinion a table spanning over fifty pages and detailing
the unclassified information that was available and could potentially support
the plaintiffs’ claims.78 This included not only media coverage and
nongovernmental agency (NGO) reports, but also documents uncovered
during inquiries conducted by the Council of Europe and European
Parliament, as well as foreign governments and law enforcement agencies.79
In doing so, the minority attempted to demonstrate the erroneousness of
dismissing the complaint at the pleading stage without first allowing the suit
to proceed based on nonclassified information. Finally, the dissent also
rejected the alternative remedies suggested by the majority not only for being
insufficient, but also for “understat[ing] the severity of the consequences to
Plaintiffs from the denial of judicial relief.”80
IV. MISAPPLICATION OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE IN JEPPESEN
Analysis of the Ninth Circuit decision in Mohamed v. Jeppesen raises a
number of important questions regarding contemporary application of the
state secrets privilege. First is the question of timing—when should the
privilege be asserted? Next is the question of how the assertion should be
assessed, that is, what is the extent of a court’s role in establishing the
validity of a claim of privilege? A third question focuses on the effects of a
successful assertion of privilege. In other words, once the government has
succeeded in asserting the privilege, how should this affect litigation? This
requires looking beyond Jeppesen alone and critically revisiting the guidance
set forth in Reynolds (or rather lack thereof). This Article suggests that the
cumulative effect of the majority’s answer to these three questions resulted in
the transformation of the state secrets privilege from an evidentiary privilege
to a doctrine of nonjusticiability with far-reaching results.

77

Id.
Id. at 1102–31.
79
Id. For instance, one such source was a public acknowledgement by the Egyptian Prime
Minister during an NBC interview regarding Egypt’s role in cooperating with the U.S.
rendition program. Id. at 1127.
80
Id. at 1101.
78
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A. At What Stage of Litigation Should the State Secrets Privilege Apply?
The majority in Jeppesen stressed the need to attempt to parse claims
raised in cases involving a state secrets privilege claim, so as to ensure that
as little evidence (or claims) as possible are precluded from the litigation of a
case.81 However, it failed to do so itself by determining in a sweeping
manner that any litigation of the case presented an unacceptable risk of
revealing privileged information and that this danger could in no way be
adequately mitigated or overcome.82
The dissent, on the other hand, required Jeppesen to first answer the
allegations against it or otherwise plead before a court begins to assess any
particularized claims of privilege regarding evidence that might be divulged
in future litigation.83 While this course of action—requiring the defendant to
first present a defense before determining whether substantiating that defense
requires reliance on privileged information—may be sound in theory, it is
possible that, in practice, Jeppesen is indeed incapable of pleading without
already compromising privileged information.
Let us assume, for example, that a covert agreement did exist between
Jeppesen and the U.S. government for the transportation of detainees to
foreign countries for detention and interrogation under the extraordinary
rendition program. Moreover, let us assume such a confidential agreement
existed in writing, extensively detailing the obligations of the parties. It is
highly likely that the provisions of such an agreement would prohibit
disclosure by Jeppesen of its existence and of the understandings in it. As a
result, Jeppesen could neither confirm nor deny the existence of an
arrangement between the company and the government. Hence, it might
have difficulty responding to an allegation on this particular matter in the
complaint.
In order to resolve this difficulty, the dissent noted that the state secrets
privilege could be employed in order to avoid the implications of refusing to
answer certain allegations.84 Hence, Jeppesen could invoke the privilege in
order to avoid responding to specific and particularized allegations in the
complaint without this resulting in an acknowledgement of the allegations.
Under this rationale, Jeppesen could assert (via the government) the state
secrets privilege at the pleading stage with regard to the existence or
nonexistence of a covert agreement to provide services to the government.
81

Id. at 1092–93 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1090 (“[W]e conclude that even assuming plaintiffs could prove their entire case
solely through nonprivileged evidence . . . any effort by Jeppesen to defend would
unjustifiably risk disclosure of state secrets.”).
83
Id. at 1098 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
84
Id.
82
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The plaintiffs would be at liberty to attempt to prove the existence of such an
agreement based on nonprivileged evidence at their disposal at later stages of
the litigation.85
The hypothetical example elucidates perhaps most vividly the diverging
approaches of the en banc panel. The majority and dissent each chose to
draw the line of their cost-benefit analysis at different stages of the litigation.
The judges of the majority opinion were presumably concerned that by
commencing the litigation, the defendants might inadvertently reveal state
secrets. Hence, as a policy choice, they preferred to dismiss the case at this
early stage in order to avoid the potential costs of allowing litigation to
proceed (e.g., having the existence of a secret agreement divulged in the
course of Jeppesen’s defense).
The dissent, on the other hand, refused to dismiss the case in its entirety
based on mere speculation as to what Jeppesen’s potential defense would be
and what evidence it might require to substantiate that defense.86 It adopted
a more surgical approach, hoping to carve away only those specific pieces of
evidence that could not be revealed, while still allowing litigation to proceed
to the extent possible. In other words, why prevent litigation altogether in an
attempt to hypothetically protect our hypothetical agreement?
Why not allow, better yet, require, Jeppesen first to respond to the
allegations to which it can and identify those to which it cannot, before
determining whether it is possible to proceed with the litigation? Granted,
this would create more work for the defendants, breaking down the
allegations and assessing what can and cannot be said with regard to each
(something any defense attorney would do anyway). It would also create
85

Whether or not Jeppesen would have an interest in revealing the existence of such an
agreement for purposes of its defense is a separate question. If anything, divulging the
existence of such a document would at the very least corroborate plaintiffs’ preliminary
allegation regarding Jeppesen’s active participation in the program (assuming the claim even
required further support beyond publicly available information collected and presented to the
court by the plaintiffs). Therefore, as a strategic matter, Jeppesen may have no interest in
making the existence of the agreement known. This illustrates the potential for abuse or
manipulation of the state secrets privilege—asserting privilege broadly in order to avoid
disclosure of evidence that would strengthen the plaintiffs’ case. Could there also be elements
in the agreement that would nonetheless help Jeppesen’s defense? Theoretically, yes, although
it is understandably difficult to hypothesize as to the nature of such elements. For instance,
such an agreement could include a provision stating that Jeppesen was given assurances by the
government that the activity it would be participating in conformed to any legal obligations it
was subject to. Even in the event that such a theoretical provision existed in our theoretical
agreement, whether this alone would necessarily absolve Jeppesen of liability is far from
certain, particularly if Jeppesen “knew or should have known” otherwise.
86
Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1096 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (“Making assumptions about the
contours of future litigation involves mere speculation, and doing so flies straight in the face
of long standing principles of [FRCP] Rule 12 law by extending the inquiry to what might be
divulged in future litigation.”) .
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more work for the district court, having to determine whether the defendants’
ability to effectively defend against the suit was compromised to an extent
that justifies dismissing the suit. Yet is this not precisely the careful and
exhaustive parsing that the majority demanded in an attempt “to salvage a
case” before undertaking “the rare step of dismissal”?87
In this context, it is important to emphasize that the majority was willing
to assume that Jeppesen’s defense did not inescapably depend on privileged
evidence.88 Accordingly, it did not dismiss the case due to a concern that
Jeppesen would be unable to effectively respond to the complaint without
divulging privileged information, and hence could be forced to forfeit its
defense. Such reasoning would be justified and necessary in order to ensure
defendants are not stripped of the ability to present to the court legitimate
defense claims. However, this was not the underlying rationale for the
majority’s dismissal. It simply preferred a more convenient (or cautious, at
best) approach with devastating results for the plaintiffs’ lawsuit.89
B. What Requires Protection? How Can Courts Assess the Validity of an
Assertion of Privilege?
Within the microcosm of national security matters, the state secrets
privilege is a most poignant illustration of the tension between the roles of
the judiciary and the executive. As noted earlier, in order to properly raise a
claim of state secrets privilege, the privilege must be asserted by the head of
the department which has the responsibility for the information and evidence
in question.90 Once this procedural requirement is satisfied, though, what is
expected of the court? How can a court assess the validity or sufficiency of
the assertion? Supreme Court precedent tells us that courts must take into
consideration, inter alia, the plaintiff’s need for information to litigate the
case, and also that, “[w]here there is a strong showing of necessity [by the
plaintiff], the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted.”91
Aside from this, little guidance is provided as to how much deference
should be given to the executive assertion. In fact, it has been noted by some
critics that “[t]he extent to which a judge should defer to an executive
official’s claim of state secrets privilege is one of the law’s ‘open areas,’ ”
which is an area with regard to which neither text nor precedent fully dictate

87

Id. at 1092–93 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1087.
89
See Lyons, supra note 15, at 120 (“[E]arly dismissal is simply inconsistent with Reynolds
and weakens its underlying value, namely to provide a forum for cases containing classified
information while still protecting this information.”).
90
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953).
91
Id. at 11.
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the judge’s course of action.92 Once the state secrets privilege has been
asserted by the proper official and the court is satisfied that the official is
familiar with the material in question and is competent to assess it, has the
court’s inquiry come to an end?
Professor Robert Chesney elegantly illustrates the obscurity surrounding
the role of the courts in assessing a claim of state privilege by presenting an
excerpt from oral argument before the Ninth Circuit in Hepting v. AT&T
Corp.,93 a civil suit challenging another controversial national security
policy, the warrantless wiretap program. Plaintiffs sued AT&T for its
complicity in the program, and the government intervened, asserting that the
state secrets privilege prevented the litigation from moving forward.94 In the
course of oral arguments, the judges attempted to discern defense counsel’s
approach as to who determines whether something is a state secret—courts
or the executive—and inquired whether they should take the government’s
assertion of state secrets essentially at face value.95 The defense, while
denying that the court should “rubberstamp” the executive’s assertion of
privilege, failed to provide a coherent doctrinal approach to the judges’ role,
instead urging them to simply give “utmost deference” to the assertion.96
In the context of the Jeppesen litigation, the government submitted a
declaration by General Hayden (Public Declaration), as formally required
under Reynolds, asserting that disclosure of the information related to the
case “ ‘reasonably could be expected to cause serious—and in some
instances exceptionally grave—damage to the national security of the United
States.’ ”97 The public declaration went on to list the information subject to
the state secrets privilege, which included:
A. Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether
Jeppesen or any other private entity assisted the CIA with any
alleged clandestine intelligence activities, including the CIA
terrorist detention and interrogation program;

92
Michael H. Page, Note, Judging Without the Facts: A Schematic for Reviewing State
Secrets Privilege Claims, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2008); see also Robert M.
Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1377 (2009) (“[N]o one
appears to know quite what to make of this guidance despite decades of subsequent litigation
involving the state secrets privilege.”).
93
Oral Argument at 5–6, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 539 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (Nos. 0617132 & 06-17137).
94
Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978–79 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
95
Chesney, supra note 92, at 1377–78.
96
Id.
97
Motion to Dismiss at 1, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir.
2009) (No. C-07-02798-JW) [hereinafter Jeppesen Motion to Dismiss] (quoting the public
declaration).
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B. Information that may tend to confirm or deny any alleged
cooperation between the CIA and foreign governments
regarding clandestine intelligence activities;
C. Information concerning the scope and operation of the CIA
terrorist detention and interrogation program, such as: the
locations where detainees were held; whether or not the CIA
cooperated with particular foreign governments or private
entities in conducting this program; the interrogation methods
used in the program; and the identities of any individuals
detained by the CIA that have not already been publicly
acknowledged; and
D. Any other information concerning CIA clandestine
intelligence activities that would tend to reveal any intelligence
activities, sources, or methods.98
The public declaration further explains, albeit only generally, why
revealing such information could cause damage to national security. For
example, disclosure by Jeppesen of whether or not it provided the alleged
assistance to the government “would cause exceptionally grave damage to
the national security by disclosing whether or not the CIA utilizes particular
intelligence sources and methods, and, thus, revealing to foreign adversaries
information about the CIA’s intelligence capabilities or lack thereof.”99
Looking at category A of information detailed in the public declaration,
several questions spring to mind. How would revealing the existence of a
relationship between Jeppesen and the government have led to disclosing
“particular intelligence sources and methods . . . thus, revealing to foreign
adversaries information about the CIA’s intelligence capabilities”?100 There
appears to be a rather large distance between confirming that a contractual
relationship existed between Jeppesen and the government and exposing
intelligence collection methods.
The public declaration, then, appears to be overinclusive. Its initial
underlying assumption is that disclosure of any details related to the
extraordinary rendition program, including those details that are far removed
from the intricacies of the Program itself, would inevitably lead to disclosure
of information that would most likely result in serious damage. It adopts a
slippery-slope premise that presumably goes something like this: if it is
revealed that Jeppesen conducted flights for the government, the countries to
98
Michael V. Hayden, Dir., Cent. Intelligence Agency, Formal Claim of State Secrets and
Statutory Privileges, para. 20, in Motion to Dismiss, supra note 97, at 53 [hereinafter Public
Declaration].
99
Id. para. 22.
100
Id.
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which those flights took place will inevitably be disclosed. This will in turn
lead to a revelation that the United States had clandestine agreements with
those countries to which the detainees were taken to, which will lead to
disclosure of the content of those clandestine agreements, and ultimately to a
disclosure of the methods used to elicit information from those detainees.
All of this could compromise the national security of the United States.
On the surface, at least, this sounds convincing. But if we break down the
potential chain reaction of events, we discover cracks in the public
declaration’s ominous premise. Perhaps the plaintiffs in Jeppesen would
have been able to substantiate their claim that Jeppesen had knowledge or
should have known what it was contributing to, based exclusively on the
confirmation of a business contract between Jeppesen and the government,
together with publically available information and plaintiffs’ testimony
regarding the nature of the extraordinary rendition program. It is impossible
to know with any certainty whether this would have sufficed for litigation
purposes, but should the plaintiffs not be given a chance to try and do so?
This is just the type of “parsing” that would have perhaps “salvaged”
plaintiffs’ lawsuit.101
One may potentially argue that the majority in Jeppesen simply adopted a
more pragmatic and economic approach than the dissent. It recognized that
the lawsuit would likely encounter challenges it would have difficulty
overcoming at later stages of the litigation, given even the dissent’s
concession that the lawsuit involved state secrets, and taking into
consideration the substantive legal questions at the heart of the lawsuit,
which would surely raise strong claims of substantive nonjusticiability.102
By dismissing the lawsuit at a relatively early stage of the proceedings rather
than allowing litigation to continue, it spared both the court and the parties
an exercise in futility.
Such an assertion, however, seems misguided. While there is certainly
value in avoiding superfluous litigation, this in itself does not justify careless
application of the state secrets privilege. Moreover, enabling the plaintiffs to
take the lawsuit forward as far along as possible carries with it considerable
advantages. Almost inevitably, it brings to light more information about the
government’s policies, thus encouraging public debate and examination and

101
See, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2010)
(noting that all claims should be parsed in order to salvage a case from dismissal, which is a
very high standard).
102
See infra notes 130–31 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Jeppesen majority
applied the state secrets privilege broadly de facto as a doctrine of non-justiciability in a
manner similar to the political question doctrine in order to avoid adjudication of sensitive
national security matters).
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potentially leading to reform. Also, as litigation continues, parties may have
more opportunities and incentive to reach a settlement.103
The obvious question is this: how are judges to determine what
information is indeed deserving of special protection? The government in
Jeppesen insisted, for example, that the interrogation methods employed in
the program are deserving of protection. The public declaration noted briefly
that revealing the interrogation methods employed by the CIA could give
terrorists an opportunity to undergo special training in their interrogation
resistance programs in order to better withstand such techniques.104
Further details on this point were not included. However, the government
also submitted a classified in camera, ex parte declaration (Classified
Declaration).105 While it is difficult to speculate what the Classified
Declaration included, it is reasonable to assume that it elaborated on how
revealing interrogation methods would compromise national security.
Reynolds tells us that the greater the plaintiffs’ need for the information, the
deeper the court’s probe should be into the government’s assertion.106 At the
very least, we would expect a court to ensure that the government’s
assessment is based on relevant information (rather than pure conjecture) and
provided by a competent professional.
On the other hand, if the court does not look any further, is it not indeed
simply rubber stamping the government’s assertion? Should the court bring
in independent experts, perhaps former intelligence officers or psychologists,
to assess whether such damage is indeed likely if interrogation methods were
to be divulged?107 Employing such tools in order to substantively assess the
validity of a government’s claim of state secrets privilege can be expected to
draw criticism from those who advocate for “utmost deference” to the
executive on such matters. It may also be time-consuming and costly.
Alternatively a limited ability to assess independently the government’s

103
This is a desirable outcome assuming that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit has merit and is not
opportunistic or that it is the efficient outcome for all parties involved. See infra notes 212–13
and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that a less accommodating judicial approach
to the government’s assertion of privilege could inadvertently encourage plaintiffs to file
disingenuous lawsuits).
104
Motion to Dismiss at 16, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir.
2009) (No. C-07-02798-JW).
105
Public Declaration, supra note 98, para. 21.
106
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953).
107
See Chesney, supra note 16, at 1311 (noting potential difficulties in appointing nonparty
experts in the context of state secrets); Meredith Fuchs & G. Gregg Webb, Greasing the
Wheels of Justice: Independent Experts in National Security Cases, 28 A.B.A. NAT’L SEC. L.
REP., no. 4, 2006, at 1, 3–5, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrat
ed/natsecurity/nslr/2006/NSL_Report_2006_11.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing a variety of
mechanisms for appointing expert advisers).
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assertion of privilege may also come at a high cost, as illustrated by
Jeppesen.
A new policy issued in September 2009 by the Obama administration
with regard to the state secrets privilege attempts to address some of these
concerns.108 A Department of Justice memo issued by Attorney General Eric
Holder (Holder Memo) sets forth a number of steps for invoking the
privilege.109 Beyond the obvious requirements of having a knowledgeable
person attest to the sensitivity of the information and expected damage, as
well as narrowly tailoring the assertion so that the privilege is invoked only
to the extent necessary,110 the Holder Memo provides for what can be
described as a supervisory mechanism. It requires the Assistant Attorney
General for the division responsible for the subject matter to formally
recommend in writing whether the Justice Department should defend the
assertion in litigation.111 A State Secrets Review Committee, consisting of
senior Department of Justice officials, is tasked with evaluating such
recommendations to determine whether invocation of the privilege is
warranted.112 The Committee then makes a recommendation to the Deputy
Attorney General or his Associate, who in turn make a further
recommendation to the Attorney General.113 Personal approval from the
Attorney General is required for defending an assertion of the privilege in
litigation.114
This construct has been termed by one commentator as “explanatory
accountability”;115 the policy requires executive officials to explain and
justify their privilege assertions, rather than political accountability, which
assumes that politicians are accountable because they can be removed from
office by voters and “involves the expectation that officials might actually be
asked to justify their particular policy decisions to others or face negative
consequences.”116 Nevertheless, Wells already points to a number of
weaknesses in the policy.117
108
Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., U.S., to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts &
Agencies, U.S. (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/ag-memo-restate-secrets-dated-09-22-09.pdf.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 2–3.
113
Id. at 3.
114
Id.
115
Christina E. Wells, supra note 25, at 629.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 644–45. Wells criticizes the policy for creating a one-sided procedure, whereby the
State Secrets Review Committee is required to “consult with the Director of National
Intelligence only when it recommends against assertion of the privilege,” which “smacks of a
mechanism allowing government officials one last attempt to convince [the Department of
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It is difficult to assess at this stage the extent to which the Holder Memo
will minimize the potential for abuse or overinclusiveness of assertions of
privilege by the government. A quantitative drop in invocation or scope of
the privilege may be one indication.118 At the same time, continued use of
the privilege, consistent with that of the previous administration, may mean
one of two opposite things: it may suggest that the Obama administration,
like its predecessor, subscribes to the slippery-slope theory that divulging
any information regarding its counterterrorism programs unduly risks
causing damage to national security—an approach that seems to be overly
broad or overly cautious at the expense of plaintiffs attempting to challenge
controversial government policies. On the other hand, it may lend support to
the theory that perhaps the Bush administration was justified in invoking the
privilege in the manner that it did with regard to national security litigation if
such assertions continue to be invoked by the present administration under a
stricter and more closely supervised procedure.
C. Consequences of Successfully Asserting the Privilege: Lack of a
Balancing Test Under Reynolds
Determining whether the assertion of the state secrets privilege by the
government is warranted is no easy task. Nevertheless, once the court is
convinced that the assertion is justified, what then? Under Reynolds,
presumably this forecloses any chance of disclosing the privileged
information, since “even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the
claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are
at stake.”119 In Jeppesen, as well as other attempted challenges to the
Justice (DOJ)] to change its mind.” Id. at 644. She notes that this is “not a neutral
accountability mechanism.” Id. She also criticizes the policy as being “too vague to force
DOJ attorneys to act as explanatory accountability mechanisms.” Id. Moreover, she finds the
breadth of the policy’s definition of national security encompassing “almost anything.” Id.
The policy does not obviously provide a mechanism for DOJ officials to question privilege
assertions. Finally, Wells charges that “there is no requirement that agency officials explain
whether narrower options are available with respect to their assertion of the privilege,” despite
the “necessity” requirement set forth in the Holder Memo. Id. at 645.
118
For the intrinsic weaknesses of such an examination, see Chesney, supra note 16, at 1252
(attempting to evaluate whether the Bush administration made greater use of the state secrets
privilege than previous administrations and noting that “[t]he quantitative inquiry is a
pointless one in light of the significant obstacles to drawing meaningful conclusions from the
limited data available, including in particular the fact that the number of lawsuits potentially
implicating the privilege varies from year-to-year”).
119
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953); see also El-Masri v. United States,
479 F.3d 296, 306 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[N]o attempt is made to balance the need for secrecy of
the privileged information against a party’s need for the information’s disclosure; a court’s
determination that a piece of evidence is a privileged state secret removes it from the
proceedings entirely.”); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 537 (E.D. Va. 2006) (“[T]he
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extraordinary rendition program, this essentially deprived those subjected to
the government’s policy from their day in court.
Reynolds presumably posits the necessity of the plaintiffs against the need
to protect sensitive information, yet this is done only with regard to the initial
stage of examining the assertion of privilege itself. Once the privilege has
been established, Reynolds does not set forth any kind of balancing test
between the plaintiff’s need for the information and the government’s need
to protect such information. The government’s interest receives exclusive
and full protection, even at the cost of dismissal.
Yet what about other policy interests beyond those of a specific plaintiff?
Should the government interest always trump those as well? If the
government has authorized the use of arguably illegal interrogation methods,
which may even amount to torture, against detainees under its control, why
should this be afforded protection by the courts? Should not the courts be
able to examine the validity of the interrogation methods, so as to ensure that
the government is not engaging in illegal conduct with monstrous effects?
There is a strong argument to be made for the public interest in adjudicating
such a case and preventing the government, if need be, from continuing to
engage in illegal conduct.120
Indeed, some critics of the Reynolds analysis—which presumably does
not allow balancing the risk to national security with other considerations—
have read Reynolds to mean that judges should weigh the magnitude of the
threatened harm to the public’s security.121 In other words, an assertion by
the government that divulging certain information would pose a security risk
would not be enough. A judge would also have to weigh the probability that
the event would actually harm the public.122 Others have rightly noted that
Reynolds was a negligence suit, and, as such, provides little guidance on how
the state secrets privilege should operate in cases in which the government
stands accused of constitutional or statutory violations.123
A balancing test involving national security might sound alarming to
some, yet it is in fact something that courts do on a regular basis.124 Courts
privilege is not subject to a judicial balancing of the various interests at stake.”); Frost, supra
note 23, at 1943; Dhooge, supra note 23, at 496.
120
For a discussion of the interference of a broad assertion of the state secrets privilege with
public rights and the role of “the People” as a check of the government, see Lyons, supra note
15, at 126–29.
121
Page, supra note 92, at 1276–77.
122
Id. at 1277 (“If, for example, the concern is exposing the Central Intelligence Agency’s
methods and capabilities, the executive official should explain to the court how disclosing
such information would harm the public. If the harm is great but the causal chain is indirect,
the risk may be low.”).
123
Telman, supra note 31, at 521–22.
124
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529–533 (2004) (determining that the
mechanism in place by the Government for the detention of a citizen deemed to be an “enemy
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are often required to balance competing constitutional interests, and this
includes myriad situations which involve national security interests. It is rare
in the constitutional landscape to have one interest, albeit a central and
weighty one such as national security, categorically and absolutely trump
other interests, particularly civil liberties and human rights. In fact, various
suggestions to create specialized courts for national security matters or
specialized procedures such as in camera review or security clearance for
attorneys,125 are potential manifestations of what a balancing approach would
look like. They are aimed at providing courts with tools to mitigate the
injury that would otherwise be caused to plaintiffs as a result of dismissal,
while at the same time not compromising national security.126 The Israeli
scheme for the protection of privileged information presented in detail in Part
V is just one example of such a balancing test.
D. From an Evidentiary Privilege to a Doctrine of Nonjusticiability
Until now I have focused on the flawed manner in which the majority in
Mohamed v. Jeppesen applied the Reynolds evidentiary privilege, as well as
inherent flaws in the Reynolds analysis itself, which provides national
security with absolute protection often at the expense of valuable competing
interests. However, the manner in which the state secrets privilege was
applied by the majority in Jeppesen (and its brethren cases)127 carries great
significance from a doctrinal perspective as well.
In terms of both timing and scope, the majority’s opinion in Jeppesen
effectively likened the privilege to a justiciability bar rather than an
evidentiary privilege. Firstly, the assertion of privilege was made at the
preliminary pleading stage. Moreover, as a result of the successful assertion
combatant” did not satisfy the due process requirement and that such an individual seeking to
challenge his classification was entitled to receive notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a
neutral decisionmaker). The Court, after weighing the security concerns presented by the
Government, found that “ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation’ of a detainee’s liberty interest
is unacceptably high under the Government’s proposed rule” and that “it [is] unlikely that this
basic process [formulated by the Court] will have the dire impact on the central functions of
warmaking that the Government forecasts.” Id. at 532–34.
125
See e.g., Chesney, supra note 16, at 1312–14 (proposing the referral of such cases in
which the state secrets privilege has been successfully asserted to a secure judicial forum akin
to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court rather than having to dismiss entirely).
126
Cf. Dhooge, supra note 23, at 500–01 (arguing that current state secret case law already
strikes an appropriate balance between civil justice and national security, and that the
formulation of special procedures that would facilitate litigation involving sensitive
information “would be an inordinate exercise in judicial creativity without Congressional
authorization or adequate precedent” that “would create considerable risk . . . to national
security”).
127
See cases cited supra note 5.
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of the privilege, the suit was dismissed without the government or the civil
defendant having to respond to the substance of the allegations at all.
Finally, it was not asserted in relation to particular pieces of evidence, but in
relation to generalized subject matter with regard to which the government
refused to divulge any information whatsoever. In fact, the split between the
majority and dissent in Jeppesen reflects precisely the difference between
applying the state secrets privilege as a justiciability bar versus applying it as
an evidentiary privilege. The dissenting opinion in Jeppesen remains faithful
to the concept of the state secrets privilege as an evidentiary privilege by
seeking to move forward to discovery and having the privilege asserted with
regard to particular evidence or information in a narrowly tailored manner.128
The gist of the majority’s opinion in Jeppesen, however, is as follows: the
subject matter of the lawsuit is so sensitive that any attempt to litigate the
matter poses an unacceptable risk to national security. When phrased this
way, the privilege becomes reminiscent of another justiciability bar—the
political question doctrine. Under Baker v. Carr,129 courts are instructed to
refrain from adjudication in certain cases which they are ill-suited to
decide.130 In essence, the majority’s opinion follows the same underlying
rationale and recognizes an additional category of nonjusticiable lawsuits:
courts are ill-suited to adjudicate disputes which involve sensitive national
security policies as a result of the complexities presented by classified
information.
Presumably, the majority in Jeppesen was concerned with the ability of
courts to ensure the adequate protection of privileged information in the
course of litigation regarding the extraordinary rendition program. However,
one cannot help but wonder to what extent these concerns were fueled by the
plaintiffs’ substantive claims themselves. Ultimately, the legal question at
128

The original Ninth Circuit panel to hear the case on appeal from the district court took a
similar approach, concluding that at this stage of the litigation, it could not evaluate the
hypothetical claims of the state secrets privilege that had been raised and therefore remanding
to the district court for consideration and determination whether any of the information is
privileged and if so, whether it is indispensible to one of the parties. Mohamed v. Jeppesen
Dataplan Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 1008–09 (9th Cir. 2009).
129
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
130
Id. at 217 (“Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.”). For an overview of the development of the political question doctrine, see
Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and
Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203 (2002).
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the heart of the suit was whether the actions engaged in by the U.S.
government were legal or not. Before it was able to determine Jeppesen’s
liability, a court would have to examine the legality of the interrogation
techniques plaintiffs were subjected to and the liability of the U.S.
government for facilitating the interrogation of detainees. Neither of these
are questions a court would necessarily be eager to answer.
Viewed from this perspective, the underlying issue in Jeppesen becomes
a classic question of justiciability—whether the court should adjudicate the
question of the legality of the extraordinary rendition program and the
potential effects of such adjudication on foreign relations. However, by
broadly applying the state secrets privilege rather than addressing head-on
the justiciability issue, the court circumvents the larger question of the role of
the judiciary in keeping in check the executive’s national security policies in
the context of the “war on terror.” The lack of genuine analysis by the
majority of why various protective measures, such as in camera review and
protective orders, would be inefficient in addressing its concerns131
strengthens the sense that the heart of the matter is essentially one of
justiciability.132
The unfortunate effect of the majority opinion in Jeppesen is twofold: it
creates bad precedent by applying the state secrets privilege very broadly in a
manner that substantially hampers the ability to subject the most invasive
government actions to judicial review and it avoids the real issue of the role
of the courts in adjudicating questions pertaining to the legality of executive
counterterrorism policy and to what extent such policies should remain
isolated from judicial review. The result, of course, is a harsh one for the
plaintiffs in this case—individuals who were allegedly subjected to horrid
treatment at the (long) hands of the government—and others who have been
subjected to various questionable national security policies. While the
majority opinion in Jeppesen does discuss alternate potential avenues of

131

Under a formalistic interpretation of Reynolds, one could argue that the court, having
determined the information is privileged, is barred from entertaining any measures which
would enable the introduction of privileged information in the course of the proceedings.
However, since the majority conceded that privileged information is not necessarily required
by either party, such protective measures would not be employed in order to facilitate the
introduction of privileged information, but rather to ensure that in case of inadvertent
disclosure, the potential risks of such disclosure would be mitigated.
132
See John Cary Sims, Ten Questions: Responses of John Cary Sims, 33 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1593, 1598 (2007) for a not dissimilar perspective, which characterizes the state secrets
privilege by the government as on its way to becoming “an additional and almostimpermeable immunity doctrine.” See also Telman, supra note 31, at 522 (positing that the
invocation of the state secrets privilege before discovery has begun, even in cases in which
plaintiffs do not need discovery in order to establish their prima facie cases, has transformed
the privilege into a form of executive immunity).
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relief for plaintiffs and others like them, as noted by the dissent,133 these are
insufficient and minimize the role of the judicial branch in maintaining
checks and balances on the government and ensuring that the state respects
the rule of law.134
An additional byproduct of Jeppesen is the de facto immunity it provides
not only to the executive but also to third-party actors who facilitate the
government’s actions. This immunity has the potential to adversely affect
the accountability of private actors for business and policy decisions they
make by exempting them from legal ramifications.135 It runs counter to the
policy schemes available in other public arenas, which are formulated to
incentivize private actors and corporations to act responsibly. In today’s
market, companies are measured more and more by their environmental and
social responsibility. Investors can direct their investments to companies that
are socially responsible. Divestment and boycott movements target those
corporations that are human rights violators or conduct business with
oppressive regimes.136 However, the holding in Jeppesen prevents a factual
inquiry into Jeppesen’s alleged involvement in the extraordinary rendition
program and its legal and moral culpability. Although the public is at liberty
to form its opinion on Jeppesen’s actions absent a judicial ruling on the
matter, potential human rights abuses by private parties are not deserving of
immunity.137
133
See supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing the dissent’s criticism of the
majority’s suggestion that alternate remedies could be made available to the plaintiffs to
address their grievances).
134
In fact, Frost has argued that if the judiciary accepts the government’s recent position on
application of the state secrets privilege, it is “abdicating its congressionally assigned task to
restrain executive power.” Frost, supra note 23, at 1954. According to Frost, “[w]hen a
litigant claims that the executive has violated a statute or engaged in unconstitutional
conduct—as [was alleged in Jeppesen]—courts serve as a check on the potential abuse of”
power based on the authority granted to them by Congress when it enacted “28 U.S.C. § 1331,
which grants courts broad federal question jurisdiction.” Id. at 1954–55. Frost concedes that
the fact that
courts have authority to hear cases challenging executive action does not
mean that they are constitutionally required to do so. It does suggest,
however, that courts should examine more closely the role that the federal
judiciary and Congress play in working together to check executive authority
before granting executive demands to dismiss these cases.
Id. at 1956.
135
See Donohue, supra note 2, at 98–99 (discussing both the abuse by companies of
privileged information in order to coerce the government to intervene on their behalf in
litigation and the use of the state secrets privilege in effect to give companies deeply
embedded in the U.S. national defense industry a form of private indemnity).
136
See generally Lucien J. Dhooge, Beyond Volunteerism: Social Disclosure and France’s
Nouvelles Rgulations Economiques, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 441, 452–63 (2004)
(discussing the growing public demand for social disclosure by companies).
137
On the other hand, the situation also prevents such private actors from exonerating
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V. STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Whenever questions of national security are involved, there is a tendency
toward a heightened sense of risk. More appears to be on the balance. The
term national security will usually evoke an increased sense of urgency or
vulnerability that is deserving of greater protection and deference.
Accordingly, it is often difficult to break away from familiar legal
approaches and conceptualize alternative approaches to national security
issues.
In this context, a look at Israeli jurisprudence pertaining to classified
information in national security litigation could be of great value. While
some jurisdictions may be easily brushed aside as irrelevant, for they do not
encounter the same security challenges as those faced by the United States
since 9/11, this is hardly the case with regard to Israel.138 In fact, targeted
killings and interrogation techniques are issues that have been the subject of
legal and political debate in Israel for the past two decades.139 Moreover,
both issues have been subject to substantive judicial review by Israel’s
Supreme Court, as will be discussed below.
While an analogy of the litigation regarding the legality of the
extraordinary rendition program or drone-operated targeted killings to other
areas of national security law may prove insufficient in terms of complexity,
a comparison to adjudication of the same issues in Israeli jurisprudence may
certainly provide valuable insight. Presently, U.S. case law may appear illequipped to effectively and efficiently handle national security litigation on
these topics. However, the recognition that this has been done successfully
themselves from such allegations. Thus, companies may remain with a tarnished reputation
without the ability to clear their names in court if they are bound by agreements that prevent
them from publicly divulging information regarding the scope of their involvement in and
knowledge of government activities. Cf. Dhooge, supra note 23, at 510 (citing the potential
damage to Jeppesen’s reputation as a result of litigation as justification for upholding the state
secrets privilege claim).
138
Setty, supra note 26, at 245 (“Israeli courts undertake a balancing analysis to determine
whether national security-related litigation ought to continue or be dismissed as nonjusticiable. This is particularly remarkable given the difficult national security situation Israel
faces.”).
139
See Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of Investigation of the General Security
Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity, 23 ISR. L. REV. 146 (1989); HCJ 5100/94 Public
Committee Against Torture v. Israel 53(4) PD 817, 826 [1999] (determining that certain
interrogation methods could not be used by Israel’s General Security Service); Amnon
Reichman, “When We Sit To Judge We Are Being Judged”: The Israeli GSS Case, Ex Parte
Pinochet and Domestic/Global Deliberation HCJ, 9 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 41, 48–70
(2001) (describing the respective positions of the judiciary and the legislature in Israel with
regard to the issue of interrogation techniques); 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture v.
Israel, 69 Dinim Elyon 1089 [2006] (determining that in certain circumstances Israel’s
practice of preemptive targeted killing would be legal under international law).
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in other jurisdictions may provide insight regarding potential directions and
trends for future U.S. jurisprudence.140
A. Privileged Evidence Under Israel’s Evidence Ordinance
The Israeli Supreme Court is the highest appellate court in Israel.141 It
enjoys original jurisdiction over actions by the state or its officials in its
capacity as the High Court of Justice (HCJ).142 In such circumstances, it is a
court of first and final instance to adjudicate such petitions. As a result,
challenges to administrative decisions or executive policy requesting
declarative or injunctive relief will usually be filed with the HCJ directly
rather than with lower courts.143
From a procedural perspective, proceedings before the HCJ are conducted
in a manner similar to cases heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. Litigants rely
primarily on written briefs supported by documents, affidavits, and oral
arguments. Witnesses are typically not examined and discovery is not
formally required and hence the proceedings are much more limited in scope
than those before a trial court.144
A mechanism similar to the state secrets privilege—privileged
evidence—exists in Israel. Unlike the United States, the treatment of
privileged evidence is codified in national legislation. Sections 44 to 46 of
the Evidence Ordinance regulate the manner in which the privilege is to be
140

Such a comparison is far from perfect and suffers from certain weaknesses, some of
which can be attributed to the different procedural rules in each country, which in turn affect
the cases that will reach the respective courts’ dockets. This will be pointed out later in the
discussion.
141
Basic Law: The Judiciary, art. 15(b)–(c), 5744-1984 (Isr.), available at http://www.kness
et.gov/il/laws/special/eng/basic8_eng.htm.
142
Id. art. 15(d)(2).
143
The issue of privileged information may of course come up before any court in Israel and
not just before the HCJ. However, since most petitions challenging government action and
requesting injunctive or declarative relief are filed with this court, it is helpful to focus on the
handling of privileged information by the HCJ.
144
See Civil Law Procedures for High Court of Justice Regulations, 1984, KT 4685, 2321
(Isr.) (setting forth the civil procedures that apply to litigation before the HCJ). Such is not
the case with regard to regular civil proceedings (e.g., contract or tort related) between private
parties and the state. Such proceedings, conducted before the relevant magistrate or district
court, depending on the subject matter jurisdiction, are subject to the ordinary rules of
procedure applicable to trial courts. Civil Law Procedures Regulations, 1984, KT 4685, 2220
(Isr.). As such, the government will have an obligation to provide documents and information
in the course of discovery. Civil Law Procedures Regulations, 1984, KT 4685, 2220 ch. 9
(Isr.), sets forth the procedures for interrogatory (questionnaires) and disclosure (discovery) of
documents. Before the HCJ, however, this obligation will be diminished, as it is not formally
required. As an alternative, plaintiffs requiring certain documents in the course of
proceedings before the HCJ may choose to employ the Freedom of Information Law, 57581998, S.H. No. 226 (Isr.), to gain access to such information.
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asserted and subsequently treated by the courts.145 The language of the
sections is general and covers both criminal and civil proceedings.
The statute distinguishes between two types of privileged information,
although the treatment of both is essentially the same: privilege for the State
and privilege for the public interest. Under section 44, the Prime Minister or
the Minister of Defense may certify evidence as privileged, if its disclosure is
likely to impair the security of the State; and the Prime Minister or Minister
of Foreign Affairs may also issue such a certificate with regard to evidence
that is likely to impair the foreign relations of the State.146 Under section 45,
evidence may be deemed privileged by any government minister who
certifies that disclosure of the evidence is likely to impair an important
public interest.147 As a result of such a determination, the evidence will be
excluded entirely from the proceedings, with neither party able to make use
of it.148 As was the case in Jeppesen, the government may also intervene in
lawsuits between private parties and present a certificate of privilege
regarding confidential information relevant to the suit.149
In contrast to the U.S. state secrets privilege, the protection provided to
privileged evidence under Israeli law is not absolute. Despite the issuance of
such a certificate of privilege by the government, a court may order the
disclosure of the evidence if it finds that disclosing it “for the purpose of
doing justice outweighs the interest of nondisclosure.”150 A petition for
disclosure of privilege for the State will be heard by a Justice of the Supreme
Court;151 a petition for disclosure of privilege for the public interest will be
heard by the court with jurisdiction to hear the case.152 Such a petition may
be heard by the same judge who presides over the case, and who will be
required to disregard the privileged information should she decide to reject
145
Evidence Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971, 2 LSI 198 §§ 44–46 (1968–1972) (Isr.),
[hereinafter Israeli Evidence Ordinance].
146
Id. § 44.
147
Id. § 45.
148
As a general matter, the admittance of secret evidence in legal proceedings is prohibited
in Israeli law, notwithstanding a small number of specialized proceedings with regard to
which the introduction of evidence ex parte has been explicitly allowed, e.g., administrative
detention proceedings. See Daphne Barak-Erez & Matthew C. Waxman, Secret Evidence and
the Due Process of Terrorist Detentions, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 3, 18–24 (2009)
(discussing administrative detention of individuals).
149
See, e.g., CA (TA) 33097/04 Freed v. Israeli Air Industry, [2004] (Isr.) (finding that a
patent dispute case over satellites should be closed to the public due to national security
issues). Similarly, a private litigant may ask the government to issue a certificate of privilege
in the course of litigation involving another private party, even if the government is not and
does not become a party to the proceeding. YAAKOV KEDMI, ON EVIDENCE, PART 2, 874
(2003) (in Hebrew).
150
Israeli Evidence Ordinance, supra note 145, §§ 44(a), 45.
151
Id. § 44(a).
152
Id. § 45.
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the petition for disclosure. Section 46 sets forth that a petition for disclosure
of privileged evidence will be heard in camera.153 The court may demand
that the evidence or its contents be brought to its knowledge, and may
receive ex parte explanations from the Attorney General (or his
representative) or from the Ministry involved in the case when reviewing the
petition for disclosure.154
While it is typically criminal proceedings that are perceived as having the
most devastating potential effects on a defendant, and hence present a
stronger case for disclosing privileged information,155 in some cases,
administrative decisions or policies can also have serious effects on personal
liberty. For instance, such decisions may lead to deportation,156 to
restrictions on travel,157 or to loss of citizenship.158
Particularly in proceedings before the HCJ, parties often forego the
formal certification of privilege.159 Plaintiffs may have an interest in
conceding that the evidence is privileged and foregoing formal certification
for a variety of reasons, for instance, an interest in expediting the process, an

153

Id. § 46.
Id. § 46(a).
155
CA 2629/98 Minister of Internal Security v. Walfa 56(1) PD 786, 794 [2001] (Isr.) (“In a
civil trial that does not involve delicate matters of life and death, the readiness to reveal
evidence which could harm the public interest may become diminished”); CrimA 2379/01
Freedman v. Israeli Police 14 Dinim Elyon 841 [2001] (Isr.) (“The task of weighing whether
or not to order the disclosure of evidence is different in criminal proceedings from the task in
civil proceedings. In a criminal proceeding, non-disclosure of evidence harms the defendant’s
constitutional right to due process and a fair trial; and a proceeding will not be fair and a trial
will not be just unless the defendant is allowed to review all of the evidence related to the
matter . . . such is not the case in a civil proceeding, with regard to which, in general, the
forcefulness of the interest in disclosure compared with the interest of the state’s security is
weaker . . . .”); see also HCJ 497/88 Shachshir v. Military Commander in the West Bank
43(1) PD 529, 535–36 [1989] (Isr.) (noting the differences between a criminal and civil
proceeding, which may affect the considerations when weighing a petition to remove
privilege).
156
Id. at 529; see also HCJ 792/88 Matour v. IDF Commander in the West Bank 43(3) PD
542 [1989] (Isr.) (affirming the military commander’s decision, based on privileged
information undisclosed to petitioners, to issue deportation orders to petitioners).
157
See, e.g., HCJ 4706/02 Salah v. Minister of Interior 56(5) PD 695 [2002] (Isr.)
(upholding the Minister of Interior’s decision, based on privileged evidence, prohibiting the
petitioner from leaving Israel because security reasons outweighed the petitioner’s freedom of
movement).
158
See, e.g., HCJ 1227/98 Malevsky v. Minister of the Interior 52(4) IsrSC 690 [1998] (Isr.)
(holding that the Interior Ministry could cancel citizenship applications or citizenship on the
basis of administrative evidence presented to it). Administrative detention hearings will also
typically involve reliance by the government on privileged information. However, as noted
above, specially tailored rules of procedure apply to such proceedings, which are outside the
purview of this Article. Barak-Erez & Waxman, supra note 148, at 21.
159
HCJ 747/09 Asaid v. Military Commander of the West Bank, Petition to File a Response
and Notice on behalf of Petitioners, at 2, 6 [2010] (Isr.) (on file with author) (in Hebrew).
154
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assessment that the court is unlikely to order disclosure, or belief that the
evidence will be detrimental to the plaintiff’s case.160 If the State has not
formally asserted privilege, it will give its consent to ex parte review of the
material by the court. If the plaintiff does not oppose this review, the court
will then be able to consider the material. Moreover, even in cases where a
formal assertion of privilege has been successfully made, although the State
is not obligated to present the information to the court, Ministry of Justice
guidelines instruct government attorneys to give their consent to ex parte
review absent extraordinary circumstances.161
As a practical matter, typically in proceedings before the HCJ challenging
an administrative decision or action, petitioners will often times give their
consent to review of privileged evidence by the court ex parte rather than
having the evidence excluded altogether. If a petitioner believes that the
privileged evidence serves her case, she may benefit from providing the
court with an opportunity to weigh the evidence despite not being able to see
it herself (including her counsel).162 Moreover, under Israeli administrative
case law, a presumption of propriety exists in favor of the State that the
relevant administrative agency made a reasonable decision.163 Accordingly,
in the context of legal challenges to administrative decisions that were made
based on privileged information, opposition by the petitioner to the
160

Id. Of course, if the plaintiff and the government disagree as to the nature of the
information and whether it is privileged, the State will be required to issue a certificate of
privilege in accordance with Section 44 or Section 45 of the Evidence Ordinance if it seeks to
prevent disclosure of the information. Israeli Evidence Ordinance, supra note 145, §§ 44–45.
161
GUIDELINES OF THE STATE ATTORNEY 12.9 (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov.il/N
R/rdonlyres/D594CB40-F512-4332-887F-51F7E89B3D5D/0/129.pdf. While these guidelines
address the issue of privileged information specifically in prisoner appeals, they are indicative of
the government’s attitude in general toward ex parte review of privileged information. The
scope of the certificate of privilege will be tailored or revised in order to facilitate review by the
court of what was previously considered “privileged” information (and remains so as far as the
plaintiff is concerned). See also, e.g., CA 6763/06 Chiat v. Israel Airports Authority 67 Dinim
Elyon 692 [2006] (“I am ordering the removal of the privilege for the purpose of review by the
trial court . . . under the following conditions: the material will not be revealed to the petitioners
and their counsel and will not be mentioned in the court’s publically available decision.”).
162
See, e.g., HCJ 792/88 Matour v. IDF Commander in the West Bank 43(3) PD 542, 549
[1989] (Isr.) (inviting petitioners to consent to review of the privileged evidence by the court
ex parte in order to “improve” petitioners’ chances of success).
163
For cases describing the presumption of propriety in favor of the State where a petitioner
does not consent to ex-parte review by the court of privileged evidence, see: HCJ 1227/98
Malevsky v. The Minister of the Interior 52(4) IsrSC 690, 711 [1998] (Isr.); AdminA 5237/05
Ministry of the Interior v. Carlson 25 Dinim Elyon 813, para. 9 [2006] (Isr.); HCJ 7712/05
Pollard v. the Government of Israel 34 Dinim Elyon 347, para. 12 [2006] (Isr.); HCJ 3519/05
Uared v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank 45 Dinim Elyon 104, para. 6 [2006]
(Isr.). This is meant to avoid a situation in which the plaintiff will exploit the government’s
legitimate inability to defend its decision because of the sensitivity of the information on
which it was based.
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presentation of privileged material to the court ex parte will make it
extremely difficult to refute this presumption.
While a successful assertion of privilege under Israeli law may
substantially hamper a plaintiff’s ability to substantiate her claims, ultimately
leading to dismissal, Israeli practice shows that a claim of privileged
information will not be raised as a basis for dismissal of a lawsuit at the
outset (unlike the situation in the United States). As explained above, under
some circumstances the government may concede to having sensitive
information presented to the court ex parte, subject to special arrangements
that will ensure confidentiality. Such arrangements may include storage of
the privileged information in the courthouse safe or redaction of privileged
information from the court’s opinion.164 In those particular cases in which
the plaintiff has security clearance, such as with former employees of the
security services or industry, the government may be willing to disclose
sensitive information to the plaintiff and to counsel with similar clearance.165
164
See CA 6763/06 Chiat v. Israel Airports Authority 67 Dinim Elyon 692 [2006] (Isr.).
Plaintiffs sued the government for alleged mistreatment in the course of a security check at the
airport, claiming they had been subjected to discriminatory and derogatory security checks,
which had also exacerbated an existing medical condition; in the course of discovery, they
requested disclosure of the state’s guidelines regarding airport security checks, arguing these
were necessary in order to prove that officials involved in the incident had acted unreasonably
and exceeded their authority; the State, after asserting privilege under Section 44 of the
Evidence Ordinance, agreed to disclose ex parte the information and provide the court with
further explanations and answers, subject to the following conditions: that the information
would not be disclosed to the plaintiffs or their counsel; that it would not be mentioned in the
decision; that it would be kept in accordance with the security guidelines provided by the
relevant security agencies; and that the court’s opinion would be provided to the state prior to
its publication in order to ensure privileged information was not inadvertently revealed. Id.
165
Such arrangements have been made for instance in lawsuits against Israel’s Nuclear
Research Center (NRCN) by employees or their benefactors suing for damages, claiming they
became ill due to exposure to dangerous chemicals at the workplace. See CA 7114/05 State of
Israel v. Chizy 62 Dinim Elyon 1263 [2007] (Isr.). Plaintiffs requested during discovery to
receive epidemiological studies conducted with regard to the NRCN’s employees. Plaintiffs’
attorney refused to submit to a security check absent a formal assertion of privilege by the
State. Two lower court decisions sided with the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court, on appeal,
rejected the State’s arguments as well, ruling that absent a formal assertion of privilege, the
State had no legal means of compelling the plaintiffs to consent to any such conditions. The
State therefore had the option of either revealing the information without counsel undergoing
a security check or formally asserting privilege, in which case the plaintiffs would be at liberty
to challenge the assertion. Following the decision, legislation was proposed to address this
lacuna and provide the government with authority to require counsel and experts to obtain
security clearance under certain circumstances. A provision in Israel’s penal code enables the
Minister of Defense to require that a criminal defendant be represented by counsel with
security clearance, but a similar provision which applies to civil proceedings or to participants
in the proceedings other than defense counsel does not exist.). For a critical analysis of the
proposal, see Letter from the Association for Civil Rights in Israel to Deputy State’s Attorney,
Shai Nitzan (Oct. 13, 2009), available at http://www.acri.org.il/he/?p=2543, and Proposed
Amendments of the Israel Bar Association Attached to the Protocol of Meeting of the Military
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The State may also provide an unclassified summary of the privileged
information or concede to certain statements of fact required for litigation.166
At the end of the day, plaintiffs may nonetheless remain unable to gain
access to information valuable to their case if the court has determined that
the privilege outweighs the plaintiffs’ interests.
B. Judicial Review of National Security Policies in Israel
The issues of interrogation methods and targeted killings—two national
security policies that are central in legal debate in the United States today—
have both come under judicial review in Israel. A petition challenging the
interrogation techniques employed by Israel’s Security Agency (ISA) was
adjudicated in the 1990s.167 The ISA is the central domestic intelligence
agency in Israel. For years, the ISA’s activities were shrouded in secrecy
(and to a great extent remain so today).168 The agency’s interrogation
methods were examined in the past by a governmental commission, which
issued a report on the matter (the Landau Commission Report) that included

and Security Committee, 19–26 (Dec. 12, 2008), available at http://www.israelbar.org.il/uplo
adfiles/_11513446W9V.doc.
166
HCJ 672/88 Al-Levadi v. Military Commander in the West Bank 43(2) IsrSC 227, 236
[1989] (Isr.) (“Additional data reports were provided to the plaintiff in the form of a
paraphrase, while omitting any identifying information which could reveal their sources. The
Court reviewed these reports in full and is convinced that the majority of information included
in them has been revealed in accordance with the standards of Article 44 of the [Evidence
Ordinance]. Additional data reports . . . were partially disclosed to [Plaintiff]. The rest of the
data reports, approximately 50, remained privileged after review by the judge.”); see also HCJ
497/88 Shachshir v. Military Commander in the West Bank 43(2) PD 529, 533 [1989] (Isr.)
(“[T]he state representatives have agreed to add the contents of some additional documents to
the list of information that can be disclosed to the plaintiff and his counsel.”); HCJ 2459/10
Estate of Wahaba v. Ministry of Defense 137 Dinim Elyon 1409 [2010] (Isr.) (involving a
civil suit for damages due to a military air strike in Gaza in the course of which civilians were
killed; the court, after weighing the importance of the information to the plaintiffs’ case and
the security concerns involved, concluded that a certain paraphrase could be released to the
plaintiffs; the government agreed to release a paraphrase confirming that “on 21.6.2006 an
[attempted] targeted killing did take place (the details and justifications of which cannot be
disclosed). The target was missed and the missile struck in close proximity to its target.”).
167
HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. Israel 53(4) PD 817 [1999] (Isr.).
168
The identity of the Head of the ISA was classified until the mid-1990s. A statute
formally detailing the ISA’s responsibilities and functions wasn’t enacted until 2002. General
Security Service Law 5762-2002, SH No. 1832 (Isr.), available at http://www.jewishvirtualli
brary.org/jsource/Politics/GeneralSecurityServicesLaw.pdf. Nevertheless, even today, Article
19(a)(1) of the ISA Law specifically provides that the “[r]ules, Service directives, Service
procedures and the identity of past and present Service employees and of persons acting on its
behalf and other particulars in respect of the Service to be prescribed by regulations are
privileged and the disclosure or publication thereof is prohibited.” Id. art. 19(a)(1). In
addition, the ISA is exempt from releasing information under Israel’s Freedom of Information
Law, 5758-1998, S.H. 226 (Isr.), art. 14(a)(2).
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a confidential section with guidelines regarding permissible interrogation
techniques.169 A parliamentary committee was responsible for monitoring
implementation of the regulations.170
In the years following the Landau Commission Report, the HCJ heard
many petitions of detained Palestinians who complained that physical force
and psychological pressure were used against them during ISA
interrogations.171 Until its decision in 1999, the HCJ rejected a large
percentage of the petitions. In isolated cases, the HCJ issued orders to show
cause and interim orders temporarily prohibiting the ISA from using all or
some of the methods. The HCJ regularly refused to rule on questions of
principle, such as whether such interrogation methods constituted torture and
whether they were legal under Israeli and international law.
The HCJ’s substantive ruling on the matter in 1999 related to seven
separate petitions that had been consolidated.172 Two were general in nature
and the remaining five were filed on behalf of individuals who had been
interrogated by the ISA while in custody,173 each of whom claimed they had
been subjected to illegal interrogation techniques.174 The HCJ examined
each of the contested interrogation techniques in light of Israel’s legal
obligations under domestic and international law, and ultimately struck down
several of the interrogation techniques that had up until that time been
employed by the ISA.175
Clearly disclosure in open court of the ISA’s interrogation techniques was
problematic. The government was prepared to present such information in
camera, however, petitioners opposed this. As a result, the information
before the HCJ was provided by the petitioners. Nonetheless, the
government did not deny the use of these interrogation methods, and even
offered justifications for these methods. The HCJ felt that it was provided
with a sufficient picture of the interrogation practices of the ISA which
enabled it to make a determination as to their legality.176
169
Symposium, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of Investigation of the
General Security Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity, 23 ISR. L. REV. 141, 148
(1989).
170
Public Committee Against Torture, 53(4) PD at 826.
171
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, B’TSELEM.ORG, http://www.btselem.org/eng
lish/Torture/Background.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
172
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, 53(4) PD at 817.
173
Id. at 824–26.
174
Id. at 836–40. These included: shaking; “shabach position,” i.e., seating a handcuffed
suspect on a small and low chair, whose seat is tilted forward toward the ground, head covered
with a sack and exposed to loud music; frog crouch position, the suspect crouched on his toes
with hands tied behind the back; excessively tight handcuffs; and sleep deprivation.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 826. Following the decision, Israel established procedures for addressing complaints
lodged against ISA personnel with regard to interrogations and founded an independent
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Israel’s targeted killings policy was also litigated before the HCJ, which
issued a monumental decision on the issue in late 2006.177 A petition filed a
year earlier on the same issue was dismissed by the HCJ in a brief, oneparagraph decision which stated that “the choice of weapons used by the
government to thwart murderous terror attacks was not a matter in which the
HCJ intervened, especially in a petition lacking any concrete factual
foundation that seeks a sweeping remedy.”178 Nonetheless, when subsequent
petitions were filed later that year raising the issue yet again, the HCJ
requested extensive briefs from the parties addressing various questions of
applicable domestic and international law.
Unlike the recent attempt in the United States to challenge the
government’s targeted killing policy,179 the Israeli targeted killing petition
did not challenge the prospective targeted killing of a specific individual.
Instead, due to Israel’s relatively relaxed standing requirements, the petition
was general in nature. Accordingly, the HCJ was not required to examine
intelligence information relating to a particular target or weigh the danger
that individual posed to national security.180
Rather, the HCJ examined whether the general practice conformed to
Israel’s legal obligations under international law, particularly the law of
armed conflict.
Eventually the HCJ determined that under certain
conditions, which it set forth, targeted killings would be legal. Before
reaching this conclusion, it examined several legal questions: the applicable
legal framework to the hostilities between Israel and Palestinian armed
investigatory body within the Ministry of Justice, whose determinations are subject to judicial
review by Israel’s Supreme Court. Irit Kohn et al., Israel’s Position on the Administered
Territories, 41 JUST. 4, 6–7 (2005), available at http://www.intjewishlawyers.org/main/files/Justi
ce%20No.41%20Spring%202005.pdf. Moreover, in 2002 the General Security Services Law
was enacted. General Security Service Law 5762-2002, SH No. 1832 (Isr.), available at http://
www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/GeneralSecurityServicesLaw.pdf. For the first
time in its history, the authority, missions and functions of the ISA were anchored in a statute. In
the course of the following two years, regulations and procedures were enacted in order to set
forth the ways in which the ISA would be authorized to act. These rules and regulations, in
accordance with Sections 19 and 22 of the Law, are to remain confidential. Id. §§ 19–22.
177
HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture v. Israel 69 Dinim Elyon 1089 [2006]
(Isr.).
178
HCJ 5872/01 3114/02 Barakeh v. Prime Minister and Minister of Defense 56(3) PD 1
[2002] (Isr.).
179
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
180
Public Commission Against Torture, 69 Dinim Elyon. But cf. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d
at 46 (explaining that judicial resolution of the suit would require the court to decide, inter
alia, the precise nature of Al-Aulaqi’s affiliation with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
whether his alleged terrorist activity rendered him a “ ‘concrete, specific, and imminent threat
to life or physical safety’ ”); id. at 47 (concluding that “there are no judicially manageable
standards by which courts can endeavor to assess the President’s interpretation of military
intelligence and his resulting decision—based on that intelligence—whether to use military
force against a terrorist target overseas”).
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groups, determining that these were governed by the rules pertaining to an
international armed conflict;181 the legal status of terrorists participating in
hostilities against Israel;182 and whether such individuals could be targetable
under international law, ultimately determining that those directly
participating in hostilities could be targeted.183
What is remarkable is that privileged evidence was not a central issue in
either of the cases and received no attention in the HCJ’s judgments.184 The
HCJ limited its review to the general legal questions before it, i.e., whether
the alleged methods of interrogation and the targeting of terrorists conformed
with Israel’s legal obligations. To some extent, this was made possible due
to the HCJ’s jurisprudence on standing,185 which enables public petitioners to
challenge the legality of executive policy. Under some circumstances, this
ability facilitates adjudication of the legal questions concerning the policy
that is divorced from its implementation with regard to a particular
individual.
Hence, in the targeted killings case, the HCJ did not need to review the
information in the government’s possession regarding a particular individual
or the options available to the government to apprehend that individual.186
181

Public Commission Against Torture, 69 Dinim Elyon at 1089, para. 21.
Id. paras. 27–28.
183
Id. paras. 29–40.
184
The court briefly mentioned the inability to review evidence ex parte in the interrogation
techniques case. HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. Israel 53(4) PD 817, 826
[1999]. In fact, in a comparative piece on the state secrets privilege, Setty reviews several
high-profile national security cases in Israel, including the targeted killings case. Setty, supra
note 26, at 244–49. She states positively that “Israel does not apply a standardized doctrine
comparable to the U.S. state secrets privilege.” Id. at 244. This overlooks the legislative
scheme set forth in sections 44–46 of the Evidence Ordinance. Interestingly, Setty instead
focuses on the Israeli Supreme Court’s analysis of justiciability or what can be likened to the
political question doctrine in the United States. This lends support to the earlier assertion that
the majority’s analysis of the state secrets privilege in Jeppesen is far more analogous to a
doctrine of nonjusticiability than it is to a traditional evidentiary privilege of exclusion.
185
See generally HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defense 42(2) PD 441, 457–72 [1988]
(Isr.) (discussing fundamental legal problems of standing and justiciability in regards to a
petition by citizens who perform reserve duty challenging the exemption given to Orthodox
Yeshiva students from mandatory national military service); Aharon Barak, Foreword: A
Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 106–
10 (2002) (arguing for a liberalized concept of standing, as outlined in his opinion in Ressler);
Baruch Bracha, Judicial Review of Security Powers in Israel: A New Policy of the Courts, 28
STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 96 (1991) (noting that the Israeli Supreme Court has broadened standing
and curtailed the nonjusticiability doctrine).
186
A petition retrospectively challenging the targeted killing of an individual, Salah
Shechade, has also been adjudicated by Israel’s Supreme Court. HCJ 8794/03 Hass v. Judge
Advocate General 91 Dinim Elyon 254 [2008], available at http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RUL
AC/pdf_state/HCJ-decision-8794-03-1-.pdf. However, the Israeli Supreme Court has yet to
contend with a petition similar in nature to Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2010), challenging the prospective targeting of a particular individual.
182

2012]

MASQUERADING JUSTICIABILITY

461

Instead, it analyzed and set forth the circumstances under which targeted
killing would be legal.187 The Israeli government has since been obliged to
carry out targeted killings in accordance with those criteria. Conversely, the
HCJ could have determined that as a general legal matter, international or
domestic law proscribed targeted killing altogether under the circumstances
of the conflict between Israel and Palestinian armed groups. By separating
the legal question from the application of the policy to a particular
individual, the HCJ overcame the barrier of confidentiality relatively easily.
The interrogation techniques litigation presented a greater degree of
complexity in this regard. Defending the interrogation methods alleged by
the plaintiffs would presumably amount to confirmation of their use—
something which must have been of obvious concern to the ISA. Similarly,
denying the use of some methods would serve as confirmation regarding the
use of others. These were certainly concerns of the U.S. government in
Jeppesen.188 Here, too, however, the court elevated its analysis to the
theoretical level and chose to examine whether the interrogation methods
alleged by the plaintiffs could be reconciled with Israel’s legal obligations.189
In practice, the government did actively defend the legality of the
interrogation methods alleged by the plaintiffs. One may say that the fact
that the government argued the case on the merits was de facto an admission
that it was using these methods. At the same time, one must question
whether there is still any real question today as to the interrogation
techniques employed by the U.S. government on national security detainees.
The consistency of personal testimony regarding these techniques,190 coupled
with the disclosure of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) memoranda regarding the legality of some interrogation

187

See supra notes 181–83 and accompanying text (concluding that those directly
participating in hostilities could be targeted).
188
See Motion to Dismiss at 73–75, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th
Cir. 2009) (No. C-07-02798-JW) (“Denial of such allegations in this case would tend to
confirm similar allegations in other cases in which the CIA could not deny such allegations.”).
189
See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text (discussing the interrogation techniques
reviewed by the court and its ultimate ruling).
190
See Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009) (describing a habeas corpus
case brought by Guantanamo Bay detainee Farhi Saeed Bin Mohammed, in which the
government sought to rely on statements obtained from Binyam Mohamed, the plaintiff in
Jeppesen). Judge Kessler, who presided over the case, found Binyam Mohamed’s account of
rendition and torture credible, explaining that it was “extraordinarily detailed” and noting that
the fact that Mohamed was vigorously pursuing his claims in British courts “suggest[ed] that
the horrific accounts of his torture were not simply stories created solely to exculpate
himself. . . . His persistence in telling his story demonstrates his willingness to test the truth of
his version of events in both the courts of law as well as the court of public opinion.” Id. at
25–26. Judge Kessler eventually refused to recognize that Mohamed’s statements presented
reliable evidence and ordered the government to release the petitioner. Id. at 32.
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techniques,191 leave little doubt as to the contours of the extraordinary
rendition program in terms of interrogation methods.
The technique employed by the Israeli Supreme Court to adjudicate
substantive legal questions pertaining to national security policies would not
be functional in a case such as Jeppesen, in which the plaintiff is a private
actor. Both the interrogation techniques and the targeted killings cases in
Israel were essentially prospective in nature, requesting injunctive relief from
further government action. A substantive ruling in Jeppesen, however,
would have ultimately required a factual determination regarding Jeppesen’s
liability for its past actions; an analysis of the legality of the extraordinary
rendition program alone would not suffice. It would, perhaps, in a case
against the government requesting declaratory or injunctive relief.
All the same, such a lawsuit would encounter other hurdles. First and
foremost, U.S. Supreme Court precedent pertaining to standing might
preclude adjudication of such a suit by a plaintiff who could not show a
likelihood of being detained and subjected to interrogation.192 In light of this
state of affairs, the decision in Jeppesen is even more perplexing, since one
191

It is important to distinguish between different types of legal opinions provided with
regard to interrogation techniques and extradition: those memos analyzing the legality of
particular interrogation methods utilized by the CIA itself, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S.
Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel, to John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel of the CIA, Interrogation
of al Qaeda Operative (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/zub
aydah.pdf, and those memos analyzing the general applicability of U.S. constitutional and
domestic law, as well as the U.S. obligations under international law, to detainees held outside
the United States, e.g., Memorandum from John Yoo, Office of Legal Counsel, to William J.
Haynes, II, Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United
States (Mar. 14, 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc-interrogation.pdf
(despite finding these legal sources did not apply to the detention of individuals outside the
United States, the memo nevertheless analyzed the legality of particular interrogation methods
under these sources). In addition, the OLC also conveyed its position regarding the legality of
transferring detainees in U.S. custody to foreign countries. See Memorandum from Jay S.
Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes, II, Re: The President’s Power as
Commander in Chief to Transfer Captured Terrorists to the Control and Custody of Foreign
Nations (Mar. 13, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memorandumpre
sidentpower03132002.pdf. It is unlikely that the OLC would analyze the legality of
interrogation techniques employed by foreign governments on behalf of the CIA. Rather, the
OLC in its memo regarding the transfer of detainees to custody in foreign nations discussed
the criminal prohibition on the transfer for the purpose of having such individuals tortured.
For a relatively comprehensive, although not exhaustive, list of OLC memos, see INDEX OF
BUSH-ERA OLC MEMORANDA RELATING TO INTERROGATION, DETENTION, RENDITION AND/OR
SURVEILLANCE, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safef
ree/olcmemos_2009_0305.pdf.
192
See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (allowing plaintiff to sue the City
of Los Angeles for damages caused after city officers subjected him to a chokehold, but
finding he could not ask the court to enjoin the city’s officers from using the chokehold in the
future, since the likelihood of him being subjected to the action again in a city as big as Los
Angeles was slim).
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would expect courts in the United States to be more, rather than less,
accessible to those plaintiffs who can actually substantiate personal harm,
instead of creating an additional barrier to adjudication under the auspices of
the state secrets privilege. Moreover, in light of the role played by political
question doctrine in the U.S.,193 such a lawsuit would likely be susceptible to
traditional claims of nonjusticiability by the government.194
C. Analysis of the Israeli and U.S. Mechanisms from a Policy Perspective
The analysis conducted by an Israeli court adjudicating a petition to
disclose privileged information differs substantially from that conducted by a
U.S. court. Under Reynolds, a court is required to examine whether
information is entitled to the privilege.195 It may balance competing interests
only at this preliminary stage of review. In contrast, the Israeli scheme
diverts focus away from whether or not the information itself is privileged
and instead requires the court to balance the competing interests even after it
is satisfied that the evidence is privileged.196
When determining whether or not to order disclosure of the privileged
information, an Israeli court determines which party—the individual or the
government—should internalize the costs of asserting the privilege. If the
court believes that the plaintiff’s interests (or the interest of justice) outweigh
the interest in keeping the information confidential, it will order the
government to disclose the information.197 Alternatively, if the court is
193
See supra note 130 (reviewing Baker v. Carr’s political question justiciability doctrine);
see also Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 44–52 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that “national
security, military matters and foreign relations are ‘quintessential sources of political
questions’ ”).
194
It may perhaps be argued that a decision setting out the legal requirements for a particular
policy and detached from the circumstances of a particular case is similar in nature to an
advisory opinion, which U.S. federal courts are not at liberty to issue. See generally R.H.
FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
79–85 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing U.S. federal courts and advisory opinions). However, this is
not the case. Such petitions in Israel have not been filed by other branches of government
regarding prospective behavior the government is contemplating. Rather, they are usually
filed by interested parties regarding a policy already in place which affects them and as such,
does amount to a concrete “case or controversy.” Most importantly, the Israeli Supreme
Court’s rulings in these cases are hardly advisory in nature, in the sense that the government is
not at liberty to overrule or disregard these judicial decisions.
195
See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s required duties
under the test).
196
See supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s ability to issue a
disclosure order if it finds that the interest in justice outweighs the need for confidentiality).
197
As noted above, Sections 44 and 45 of the Evidence Ordinance provides that a court may
order disclosure of privileged information if it “finds that the necessity to disclose it for the
purpose of doing justice outweighs the interest of non-disclosure.” Israeli Evidence
Ordinance, supra note 145, §§ 44–45.
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convinced that the security interest in keeping the information confidential
outweighs other interests, it will dismiss the petition for disclosure, even if as
a result, the plaintiff’s ability to substantiate the case is significantly
hampered.198
However, it is important to emphasize that even when the court reaches
the conclusion that disclosure of the privileged information is required, the
government can still avoid disclosure if it so chooses. In criminal cases, the
prosecution has the option of either disclosing the evidence or protecting it
by withdrawing the indictment.199 In civil cases in which the State is the
respondent or defendant, the State has the option of settling the case if it
wishes to prevent disclosure.200 Hence, the disclosure of information can be
avoided at several junctions—plaintiff, for various reasons, may decide not
to challenge an assertion of privilege; if the assertion is challenged, the court
may determine that disclosure is unwarranted; and finally, even if the court
orders disclosure, the state may take action to obviate that need.
As a result, under Israel’s legislative scheme, at times it will be the
government that is forced to internalize the costs of disclosing privileged
information. Courts may still make a determination, and will often do so,
that the privileged information is to remain undisclosed, in effect
substantially hampering the other party’s ability to plead its case.
Nevertheless, contrary to the U.S. scheme, this will not automatically be the
result of any successful assertion of privilege.
Under Jeppesen and its brethren, however, it is the individual that is left
to bear the costs of the government’s assertion of privilege entirely. In this
context, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v.

198
See cases cited supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing the balance conducted
by courts in civil proceedings involving privileged evidence).
199
Ami Kobo, Privileged Evidence and State Security Under the Israeli Law: Are We
Doomed to Fail?, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 113, 116 (2006). See, for example,
CrimA 2489/09 Braude v. State of Israel 54 Dinim Elyon 890 [2009] (Isr.), available at http://
elyon1.court.gov.il/files/09/890/024/t03/09024890.t03.pdf, in which the State withdrew the
indictment against the appellant after it was ordered by the Supreme Court, in accordance with
Section 46 of the Evidence Ordinance, to hand over to the defendant privileged information
which could potentially be of use for purposes of his defense. Although the defendant was
initially charged with two counts of aggravated assault for shooting and injuring two
individuals in the course of an altercation between Jewish and Arab residents in Hebron, the
government’s position was that the price to the public of revealing the information outweighed
the public interest in proceeding with the prosecution.
200
Nevertheless, there will still be cases in which the State may be ordered to disclose
privileged information relevant to a proceeding between two private parties, in which case its
ability to avoid such disclosure will be very limited or simply nonexistent. See CA 2629/98
Walfa 56(1) PD at 794, in which the State was ordered to reveal whether the defendant in a
civil suit had served as a police informant in a criminal investigation regarding the plaintiff,
since the information had bearing on a contractual obligation between plaintiff and defendant.
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Bush,201 is particularly telling (and puzzling). The plaintiff attempted to
challenge the government’s warrantless wiretap program.202 In an effort to
substantiate standing to sue, the plaintiff relied on a confidential document
that was inadvertently disclosed to it by the government in an unrelated
matter.203 Upon learning of the inadvertent disclosure, the FBI retrieved all
copies of the document from Al-Haramain’s counsel, but not from its
directors.204 The district court granted the government’s motion to bar AlHaramain from access to the document on the basis that it was protected by
the state secrets privilege;205 however, it allowed the plaintiff to file in
camera affidavits attesting to the contents of the sealed document to support
its assertion of standing.206
The Ninth Circuit reversed this part of the district court’s decision, ruling
that the district court erred in allowing plaintiffs to reconstruct the
document’s contents from memory, as this circumvented the document’s
privilege (which both courts agreed had not been abrogated by the
inadvertent disclosure).207 While from a purely doctrinal perspective the
ruling may comport with Reynolds’ rationale that once asserted successfully,
the privilege is absolute, common sense nonetheless begs the question of
precisely what interests the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was attempting to protect,
given that the information had already been revealed to the plaintiffs and
hence the damage already done.208
201

Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190 (2007).
Id. at 1193.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 1195.
205
Id. at 1195–96.
206
Id. at 1196.
207
Id. at 1204.
208
Further disclosure of the contents of the sealed document could have been prevented
using various protective measures, such as redactions where necessary in the court’s opinion.
The lawsuit nonetheless survived due exclusively to the fact that it related to surveillance (as
opposed to the matter of rendition at the heart of Jeppesen). FISA requires the government in
the course of discovery to make available even those materials whose disclosure would harm
national security (such information may be reviewed in camera and ex parte) so that a court
may determine whether the surveillance of an “aggrieved person” was lawfully authorized and
conducted. The court may even disclose such information to an aggrieved person using
protective measures. The Ninth Circuit therefore remanded the case for the lower court to
determine whether the legislative scheme under FISA preempted the state secrets doctrine.
The district court eventually found that FISA did trump the state secrets privilege and went on
to review the document and enter summary judgment for the plaintiff. See Lee Tien,
Litigating the State Secrets Privilege, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 675, 681–83 (2010)
(discussing the Al-Haramain litigation). The end result of the Al-Haramain litigation further
emphasizes the absurdity of preventing introduction of the document in the first place (when
protective measures could be employed to prevent its full public disclosure) or alternatively
requiring the government to concede to certain facts supported by the document for the
purpose enabling Al-Haramain to establish standing.
202
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From a policy perspective, this trend of the Ninth Circuit makes little
sense.209 It hardly motivates the government to assert the privilege less
rather than more often. On the contrary, asserting the privilege carries no
disadvantages for the government—it does not require making special
arrangements that will allow the court to consider the information in the
course of litigation and does not require the government to make certain
concessions that will allow litigation to proceed. Under Jeppesen,210 if the
government succeeds in convincing a court that even some of the
information related to the lawsuit is privileged—even if this information is
not crucial to prove or refute the allegations—it may be exempt from the
litigation altogether. Such a convenient state of affairs for the government
hardly encourages rare use of the privilege.211
Chesney, however, cautions against a legal scheme which obliges the
government to choose between permitting the suit to go forward or else
having judgment rendered for the plaintiff, rather than simply receiving the
benefit of having the complaint dismissed.212 While he recognizes the
“virtue of forcing the government rather than the individual to internalize the
costs of maintaining government secrecy, . . . [i]t has a vice as well . . . as the
lack of a merits inquiry might encourage a multiplicity of suits not all of
which would be warranted.”213 He further warns that “[t]he governmentpays solution also is impractical and undesirable for litigants seeking
nonmonetary relief, such as injunctions against the further conduct of certain
government policies.”214
In light of the Israeli experience, neither concern seems necessarily
warranted. Some mechanisms already in place, such as the standing
requirement215 and FRCP rules requiring plaintiffs to state a valid claim,
209
See Telman, supra note 31, at 512 (arguing that “there is no justification for the selfinterested invocation of the state secrets privilege in favor of the government when it is
adverse to persons who are seeking enforcement of statutory or constitutional rights”
(emphasis added)).
210
Mohammed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010).
211
Id. at 511 (commenting that the invocation of the state secrets privilege appears to be
relatively costless for the government); Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 24, at 102 (noting that
“[i]t is hardly surprising that” the executive would be tempted to employ “such an effective
tool . . . with increasing frequency and in a variety of circumstances”).
212
Chesney, supra note 16, at 1313.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Article III standing jurisprudence, as developed by the U.S. Supreme Court over the
years, requires that plaintiffs meet three requirements in order to substantiate standing and
proceed with their suit: the showing of an injury-in-fact which is concrete and particularized;
the existence of a causal link between the injury suffered and the allegedly unlawful conduct;
and a showing that the requested relief will likely redress the injury. Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). In particular, plaintiffs must substantiate standing for
each type of relief requested. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 95 (allowing plaintiff to sue the City of
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would help safeguard from unwarranted lawsuits. Moreover, plaintiffs
would still be required to show that the privileged information is indeed
relevant and necessary for litigation of the case. Hanging a lawsuit loosely
on privileged information, which is of little relevance to the case or is not
necessary, would not suffice to back the government into the corner and
force it to settle. Moreover, additional safeguards could be put in place to
further ensure that the system is not abused (i.e., giving the court the option
of reviewing the evidence ex parte or in camera, implementing a
presumption in favor of the government if the plaintiff refuses to consent to
ex parte review). Given the potentially high litigation costs, plaintiffs would
still be deterred from initiating frivolous lawsuits. As for those plaintiffs
seeking nonmonetary relief, the same legal scheme could essentially apply,
the difference being that internalization by the state of the costs of
withholding information from such plaintiffs could result in the government
having to abstain from the challenged conduct.216
Given U.S. precedent on state secrets privilege, such an approach may
seem radical. However, in essence it is no more radical than current
jurisprudence, which categorically prefers the interests of the government
over those of the individual and grants privileged information absolute
protection.217 In fact, it is less extreme, as it still allows courts to prevent
disclosure altogether in appropriate circumstances. The effect of the current
judicial approach in the United States, which results in dismissal of cases in
which the state secrets privilege is successfully asserted, is complete
Los Angeles for damages caused after city officers subjected him to a chokehold, but finding
he could not ask the court to enjoin the City’s officers from using the chokehold in the future,
since the likelihood of him being subjected to the action again in a city as big as Los Angeles
was slim). For recent cases dismissing plaintiffs’ attempt to challenge the legality of the
government’s warrantless wiretap program due to lack of standing as a result of plaintiffs’
inability to substantiate that they had been subjected to surveillance in the context of post-9/11
national security litigation, see American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency,
493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007), Amnesty International U.S.A v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d
633 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), rev’d, Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2011), and
Jewel v. National Security Agency, 2010 WL 235075 (N.D. Cal. 2010), rev’d, Jewel v. NSA,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 25951 (9th Cir. 2011). See also Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d
1 (D.D.C. 2010) (refusing to recognize plaintiff’s standing to challenge the alleged targeting
by the U.S. government of his son, a terrorist operative with links to Al-Qaeda).
216
Similarly, see, HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. Israel 53(4) PD 817,
826 [1999] (“The petitioner . . . was arrested and interrogated.
He turned to this
Court . . . [and] claimed that he was being deprived of sleep and was being seated in the
“Shabach” position. The Court issued an order nisi and held oral arguments immediately.
During the hearing, the state informed the court that ‘at this stage of the interrogation, the GSS
is not employing the alleged methods.’ For this reason, no interim order was granted.”)
(author translation).
217
See Dhooge, supra note 23, at 496 (concluding that “even the most compelling need
demonstrated by” Jeppesen plaintiffs would be insufficient to overcome the “absolute” state
secrets privilege).
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internalization of the costs of asserting state secrets privilege by the
individual rather than the State. From a utilitarian perspective, this may
seem justified—the dismissal of a few individual lawsuits is preferable to the
cessation of important national security programs simply because the
government wishes to avoid disclosure of sensitive information. However,
this dichotomy is clearly too simplistic. Current U.S. jurisprudence on state
secrets privilege, as reflected by Jeppesen, affects more than a single
plaintiff. It in effect insulates from judicial review legally controversial
government action, such as the warrantless wiretap program or the
extraordinary rendition program. Such programs may affect countless
individuals. Moreover, it is not only the potential adjudication of these
issues that could adversely affect foreign relations, but also their lack of
adjudication and legal scrutiny that may tarnish the U.S. reputation.218
One could argue that the balance struck by Israeli courts when they
encounter privileged information goes too far in accommodating the interests
of plaintiffs challenging government action or seeking compensation, and
compromises security, and as such, would be undesirable for the United
States.219 From an empirical perspective, it is obviously difficult to assess
218
Domestic litigation may even have pragmatic impacts in the international arena. For
instance, the adjudication by the Israeli HCJ of the petition in the matter of the Shechade targeted
killing contributed to the dismissal in Spain of a criminal complaint against high-ranking Israeli
officials presumably responsible for the operation under Spain’s universal jurisdiction
provisions. The Spanish Supreme Court was satisfied that Israel had a genuine and credible
judicial system, inter alia, in light of the litigation that had taken place on the matter before the
HCJ, as a result of which the government had appointed an investigative commission. Ido
Rosenzweig & Yuval Shany, Update on Universal Jurisdiction: Spanish Supreme Court Affirms
Decision to Close Inquiry into Targeted Killing of Salah Shehadeh, ISR. DEMOCRACY INST. (Apr.
5, 2010), http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/terrorism-and-democracy/issue-no-17,-may-2010/update-o
n-universal-jurisdiction-spanish-supreme-court-affirms-decision-to-close-inquiry-into-targeted-k
illing-of-salah-shehadeh/.
219
Many in Israel would disagree with such a positive assessment of the Israeli mechanism.
Much of this criticism is directed at administrative detention proceedings, which under law may
be conducted on the basis of evidence introduced ex parte. See, e.g., HAMOKED CTR. FOR DEF.
INDIVIDUAL, WITHOUT TRIAL: ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION OF PALESTINIANS BY ISRAEL AND THE
INTERNMENT OF UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS LAW (2009), http://www.btselem.org/Download/2009
10_Without_Trial_Eng.pdf. However, criticism of the general legal mechanism described in this
article is abundant as well. See generally Kobo, supra note 199, at 118–25. Also of interest in
the context of litigation involving privileged information are the circumstances surrounding HCJ
2028/08 Public Committee Against Torture v. Minister of Justice (withdrawn). For the
circumstances surrounding HCJ 2028/08 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, see The
Judges Heard Classified Material — The NGOs Withdrew Their Petition, PUB. COMMITTEE
AGAINST TORTURE ISR. (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.stoptorture.org.il/en/node/1205, and Ido
Rosenzweig & Yuval Shany, Human Rights NGOs Withdraw from a Constitutional Petition, ISR.
DEMOCRACY INST. (May 2009), http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/terrorism-and-democracy/issue-no-5,may-2009/human-rights-ngos-withdraw-from-a-constitutional-petition/.
Petitioners, several
human rights organizations, challenged the constitutionality of provisions of the Criminal
Procedure, which extended the period of detention in custody of suspects in security offenses
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whether or not, or to what extent, Israeli security has been compromised as a
result of the jurisprudence on privileged information.220 One potential
method of assessing the suitability of the current mechanism is to examine
whether demands for legislative reform have been made in response to the
current jurisprudence. For instance, as noted earlier, in 2007, the Israeli
Supreme Court refused to recognize the right of the government, absent a
formal assertion of privilege, to condition the disclosure of evidence on the
fulfillment of certain requirements by plaintiffs and counsel, such as security
clearance.221 In response, proposed legislation was introduced which would
enable the government to require that counsel and experts on behalf of
plaintiffs receive security clearance as a condition for conducting civil
litigation.222
Nevertheless, since the formulation of the privileged
information scheme in Israeli legislation, it has not been altered or
amended.223 In fact, as detailed above, courts have developed a number of
means for handling privileged information which are meant to enable
litigation to proceed.224
From a substantive perspective, perhaps a more appropriate question is
not whether national security is compromised by a more liberal approach to
state secrets, but rather to what extent some reduction in security would still
be justified by the strengthening of other values society holds dear, such as
the protection of personal liberties, due process, or the redress of injuries
inflicted by the government. If one’s starting point is that national security
deserves absolute protection or deference, then this would indeed result in
the striking down of any legislative or judicial scheme which interferes (even
a little) with national security. However, if one is willing to concede that
prior to being brought before a judge and enabled courts to conduct some hearings regarding
custody without the presence of the suspect. The court agreed to review evidence presented by
the government ex parte in support of the legislation despite petitioners’ objection (the basis for
this decision is not entirely clear, as the court did not publish a detailed decision). In response,
petitioners refused to continue to take part in the proceedings and withdrew the petition. The
Judges Heard Classified Material — The NGOs Withdrew Their Petition, supra note 219;
Rosenzweig & Shany, supra note 219.
220
One potential way for examining whether damage has been done to national security
interests would be to consult experts in the field. However, the reliability of this method and
its accuracy are hardly scientific. Moreover, challenges could be encountered when
attempting to define the group of cases to be looked at and assessed. Not all cases may be
available for examination and the damage caused in some cases may be difficult to quantify.
At any rate, such an assessment is beyond the scope of this Article.
221
CA 7114/05 State of Israel v. Chizy Dinim Elyon 1263 (62) [2007] (Isr.).
222
For a description of proposed legislation and its critical analysis, see supra note 164 and
accompanying text.
223
Sections 44–46 of the Evidence Ordinance have remained unchanged since the statute’s
enactment in 1971.
224
See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text (detailing the protective measures agreed
to by the state in order to enable ex parte review of privileged materials in the case).
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national security should be balanced with other interests, even at a certain
cost to national security (or perhaps simply increasing the monetary costs
borne by the government), then the question becomes one of how such a
balance should be struck. This Article seeks to demonstrate that although
national security is a top concern in both Israel and the United States, Israel
has chosen a different balancing point than the United States with regard to
privileged information. Such a balance may not be ideal, nor should it
necessarily be adopted “as is” by the United States, but it does illustrate an
alternative approach to the issue of state secrets—an approach to which the
U.S. administration appears to have been unreceptive so far.
On a final note, a discussion of contemporary use of the state secrets
privilege in the United States would be incomplete without mentioning
proposed legislation seeking to formalize use of the privilege and delineate
its borders. The State Secrets Protection Act (SSPA) was first introduced in
the Senate during the 110th Congress in 2008.225 The bill is partially
modeled after its criminal law counterpart, the Classified Information
Procedures Act (CIPA),226 “and designed to codify a ‘safe, fair, and
responsible’ state secrets privilege.”227 It addresses many of the current
weaknesses of the state secrets privilege discussed above and incorporates a
number of mechanisms which purport to mitigate the damaging effects that
asserting the privilege may have on national security litigation. Specifically
with regard to the timing of asserting the privilege, the bill sets forth that a
court shall not grant a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment
based on the privilege until the party adversely affected “has had a full
opportunity to complete nonprivileged discovery and to litigate the issue or
claim to which the privileged information is relevant.”228 Moreover, in cases
in which privileged information is necessary and it is impossible to create a
nonprivileged substitute, courts are allowed to “weigh the equities and make
appropriate orders in the interest of justice.”229
These and other aspects of the proposed litigation are similar in nature to
the Israeli practice relating to privileged information. In fact, the bill goes

225

State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, 110th Cong. (2008).
18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16 (1980). “CIPA creates procedures for the disclosure and
utilization of classified information relating to national security in federal criminal
prosecutions. These procedures include: pretrial conferences, protective orders, rules relating
to discovery, in camera hearings, and restrictions upon admissibility.” Dhooge, supra note 23,
at 502 n.159.
227
Sean Michael Ward, Note, The State Secrets Protection Act (SSPA): Statutory Reform of
the State Secrets Privilege, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 681, 682 (2009).
228
State Secret Protection Act, H.R. 984, 111th Cong. § 7(c) (2009).
229
Id. § 7(d). These include: “striking the testimony of a witness, finding in favor of or
against a party on a factual or legal issue to which the information is relevant or dismissing a
claim or counterclaim.” Id.
226
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beyond Israeli legislation in prescribing the various orders and methods that
courts can employ.230 It has the potential to infuse the current application of
the state secrets privileged with much-needed balance. As Chesney opined
shortly after introduction of the bill:
[U]nder the SSPA the litigation process will proceed through
the pleading and discovery stages, with the privilege being
wielded as a scalpel rather than a bludgeon. Combined with
the other procedural elements of the SSPA—including
especially the role of special masters, guardians-ad-litem, and
the emphasis on finding substitutions when possible—the net
effect of this “proceduralization” of the privilege should ensure
more careful tailoring to the facts and evidence in a particular
case. This in turn should reduce the risk of erroneous
application (and thus injustice). Though this benefit will come
at the cost of increased litigation expense and complexity, it is
a cost that is most likely worth bearing. At the very least, the
experiment is worth undertaking.231
It remains to be seen, however, whether and when such legislation will be
passed and what its final contours would be.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Mohamed v. Jeppesen exposes
the weaknesses of the state secrets privilege as prescribed under United
States v. Reynolds. Beyond that, Jeppesen serves as an illustration of the
misapplication by courts of the state secrets privilege in a manner that
transforms it into a threshold claim of nonjusticiability rather than an
evidentiary privilege. Disguising this emerging justiciability barrier under a
state secrets analysis circumvents the larger debate regarding the role of the
judiciary in monitoring the executive when it comes to national security
policies.
The current leniency that U.S. courts have shown toward the
government’s assertion of state secrets privilege as grounds for dismissal is
creating a worrisome precedent. The current scheme disincentivizes the
230

While Israeli legislation formalizes the assertion of the privilege and recognizes that
judges may exercise discretion to balance competing interests of the parties, it does not
formally set out the methods which courts may employ in order to protect privileged
information while facilitating litigation.
231
Robert M. Chesney, Legislative Reform of the State Secrets Privilege, 13 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 443, 467 (2008).
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government from carefully sifting through its information and separating
privileged from nonprivileged information or searching for creative solutions
that will enable adjudication of these core issues to move forward.
Furthermore, once the privilege is successfully asserted, the plaintiff fully
internalizes the costs. As the application of the privilege widens and results
in dismissal, these costs become devastating for the plaintiff’s case.
Israel, a country which is no stranger to security threats and has been
dealing with questions pertaining to national security policies for many
years, has in place a statutory mechanism which regulates the handling of
privileged evidence in legal proceedings. Unlike the state secrets privilege
under Reynolds, Israel’s statutory scheme incorporates a balancing test that
allows disclosure of such information in the interest of serving justice.
While privileged information may still ultimately be excluded from
litigation, in effect devastating a plaintiff’s chances of success, this will not
necessarily be the outcome every time the privilege is successfully asserted.
Under some circumstances, a court may recognize that information is
privileged and still order its disclosure. Moreover, the privilege has never
been invoked as a threshold claim for dismissal.
Granted, the specific circumstances of litigation surrounding interrogation
techniques and the targeted killing policy in Israel differ from those in the
United States. The ability to conduct such litigation in Israel is effected by
several factors, among them, the identity of the parties, Israeli jurisprudence
pertaining to standing, and the Israeli Supreme Court’s rules of procedure
when sitting in its capacity as the High Court of Justice. Nonetheless, the
fact that the legality of these policies was successfully litigated in a society
that places great importance on national security deserves consideration.
At the end of the day, the value of the Israeli experience is not only that it
presents an alternative legal mechanism to the one currently in place in the
United States, but also that it presents a different attitude altogether toward
national security litigation and privileged information. In the present
environment in the United States, it is difficult to even conceive of
adjudication of such sensitive matters. However, Israeli jurisprudence shows
that such adjudication is possible given not only a more accommodating
legal scheme but also a more receptive mindset.

